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U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A MODEL 
FOR GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 
RICHARD B. STEWART* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the potential for drawing on U.S. administrative law 
in the development of a global administrative law1 to secure greater account-
ability for the growing exercise of regulatory authority by international or 
transnational governmental decisionmakers in a wide variety of fields.  U.S. 
administrative law and practice might form one useful point of departure for 
developing both “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to understanding and 
further developing global administrative law.  A global administrative law must, 
of course, draw on legal principles and practices from many domestic and re-
gional legal systems and traditions, as well as from sources in international law.  
Accordingly, the U.S.-based perspective offered in this Article is only one of 
many that must be considered. 
The past several decades have witnessed an explosive development of a 
great variety of international economic and social regulatory regimes.2  These 
regimes have been created in response to the rise of a global market economy 
(itself constructed through private and public international law regimes), the 
consequences of economic, social, environmental, informational, and other 
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 1. The term international administrative law has in recent decades been limited to administrative 
rules, procedures, and tribunals relating to the staff of international organizations.  See C.F. 
AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, p. 103-09 (1988).  Earlier in the twentieth century, a broader concep-
tion of international administration and administrative law was recognized.  See Paul S. Reinsch, Inter-
national Administrative Law and National Sovereignty, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1909); Pierre Kazansky, 
Théorie de l’administration internationale, 9 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
353 (1902). 
 2. Some of these global regulatory regimes are bilateral.  Others are multilateral, including some 
of regional and some of global scope.  Further, as developed below, some of these regimes are estab-
lished by treaties to which states are parties, while others consist of networks or other cooperative ar-
rangements among domestic officials responsible for a given area of regulation, and still others are 
private or hybrid public–private in character.  This article refers generically to all these different types 
of regimes as global regulatory regimes. 
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forms of interdependence, and the perceived inadequacies of purely national 
solutions in the problems generated by those consequences.  These regulatory 
regimes encompass a wide variety of subject areas, including trade; finance and 
banking; environment, health, and safety; pharmaceuticals; transportation and 
communications; conditions on financial assistance; human rights; and unlawful 
or undesirable activities.  These regimes respond to the failures of both markets 
and of decentralized national systems of regulation to secure important eco-
nomic and social values.  They also often include bodies that are administrative 
in character and that make regulatory decisions and create regulatory law that 
is domestically implemented.  As Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart explain in 
“The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” 3 the traditional paradigms of 
international law and of administrative law at the domestic level cannot ade-
quately account for or address these new global regulatory regimes, which are 
creating a new field of global administration and administrative law. 
How can these global regulatory regimes be made accountable to the actors 
or publics whose interests they are supposed to serve?  This is the question be-
ing addressed by new, emerging forms of global administrative law.  Putting the 
issue in terms of accountability immediately raises the questions of to whom 
account is due, and by what means.4  One approach is to ensure that administra-
tive decisionmakers implementing a global regulatory regime—which can in-
clude domestic administrative officials implementing global regulatory norms as 
well as officials at the global level—are faithful to that regime and the states 
that have established it.  Another is accountability to those ultimately subject to 
regulation, including private individuals and entities, business firms, and in 
some cases NGOs, in order to ensure that their rights are secured and their in-
terests respected.  A third approach is accountability to the broader publics, 
either domestic or global, that are protected or otherwise affected by the re-
gime.  It must also be borne in mind that administrative law is only one means 
among many others that can be deployed to promote accountability and help to 
ensure that global regulatory regimes in fact serve their justificatory ends, rais-
ing the question of its appropriate role in relation to other mechanisms.5 
Further, what should the normative ambition of global administrative law 
be?  Should it aim to ensure the smooth and effective instrumental functioning 
of global regulatory regimes?  Should it ensure that administrative agents are 
faithful to their principals, however defined?  Should it seek to protect the 
rights of private actors?  Should it secure the interests of relevant domestic or 
global publics?  Based on a broader conception of its role, what is the relation 
between global administrative law and the much debated question whether, and 
to what extent, governance at the global level can be conceived and realized on 
a democratic basis? 
                                                          
 3. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart]. 
 4. See Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 
AM POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005); Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 3, at 27-42. 
 5. See id. 
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A. Three Basic Types of International Regulatory Regimes 
For purposes of this article, three basic types of international regulatory re-
gimes can be distinguished: 
Treaty-based international regulatory regimes are established by treaties or 
other agreements among nations that establish and oversee implementation of 
international regulatory standards.  These regimes often include a secretariat 
and other institutional features of an international intergovernmental organiza-
tion.  Examples include trade regimes like NAFTA and the WTO, environ-
mental regimes such as the Montreal Protocol (regulating stratospheric ozone 
depleting chemicals), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
and the various U.N. organizations. 
Transnational regulatory networks are developed by national regulatory of-
ficials responsible for specific areas of domestic regulation.  These officials 
communicate and meet informally, and may agree to uniform or harmonized 
regulatory standards and practices in order to reduce barriers to trade and 
commerce created by differing national regulations.  They also address transna-
tional regulatory problems, including those posed by multinational enterprises 
operating across many jurisdictions, that exceed purely domestic capabilities.6  
Having agreed to such standards or practices with their counterparts in other 
countries, these officials then adopt and implement them in their capacities as 
domestic regulatory officials.  In addition to or as an alternative to agreement 
on common regulatory standards, such officials may pool information and dis-
cuss and coordinate regulatory policies and enforcement practices.  These 
global regulatory networks have emerged in areas such as antitrust, banking, 
securities, telecommunications, chemicals regulation, taxation, and transporta-
tion safety.  For example, national regulators might agree to accept each other’s 
product regulatory standards as mutually equivalent, or pool information and 
coordinate antitrust measures to address the practices of multinational firms. 
Another form of international regulatory cooperation consists of mutual 
recognition agreements and cooperative regulatory equivalence determinations 
by regulators in different countries with different regulatory requirements.  
Under mutual recognition agreements, which are typically bilateral in charac-
ter, regulators in one country accept the product or service regulatory certifica-
tion procedures or standards of another country as equivalent to or compatible 
with their own, in exchange for similar recognition of their own measures.7  Pur-
suant to such agreements, products or services originating in one country and 
complying with its regulatory requirements can enter or be provided in the host 
country without being subjected to its separate, additional regulatory require-
                                                          
 6. For an introduction to global regulatory networks, see ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2000-2001); see also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The 
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998). 
 7. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes—The 
Dilemmas of Accountability, Rights and Democracy Beyond the State, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 
(Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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ments, to the extent provided by the agreement.  Mutual recognition can in-
clude the jurisdictions’ differing mechanisms for determining (including through 
certification procedures) conformance with applicable regulatory standards 
and/or the standards themselves; the former currently predominate.8 
As an alternative to entering into more or less formal agreements providing 
for mutual recognition, regulators in different countries can follow more infor-
mal methods of cooperation under which a regulatory agency accepts regula-
tory conformity determinations by an agency in another as equivalent to its own 
in the expectation of reciprocal treatment.9  These forms of actively managed, 
horizontal regulatory cooperation between administrative agencies in different 
areas are being used increasingly to address technical barriers to trade and dif-
ferences in environmental, health, safety, and other regulatory standards and 
promote trade by reducing or eliminating need for multiple regulatory approv-
als for internationally traded products and services.10  The use of such arrange-
ments with respect to services is currently limited but is expected to grow.11 
In practice, the distinction between treaty-based and network regulatory re-
gimes is not always clear-cut.  Formal international regimes often provide a fo-
rum for informal networking among domestic regulatory officials.  Some regu-
latory networks function through their own international organizations (which, 
however, are generally not treaty-based), although others are loose-knit and 
highly informal.  Likewise, practice might often blur the distinction between 
adoption of common standards by informal networks of domestic government 
regulators and mutual recognition arrangements and equivalence practices by 
such regulators.  In principle, mutual recognition agreements and other coop-
erative regulatory equivalence practices are a way of accommodating different 
substantive regulatory standards and conformity determination methods in dif-
ferent countries, but they might evolve toward harmonization of standards and 
methods. 
                                                          
 8. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Rebecca Steffenson, Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlan-
tic Marketplace, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4, 5 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, 
eds., 2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Australia’s Meat Safety Enhancement Program (MSEP), 64 Fed. Reg. 30299 (June 7, 
1999) [hereinafter Australian Meat] (finding Australia’s system of meat inspection equivalent); Fran-
cesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after Enlargement, in LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 97 (George A. Bermann & Katharina Pistor, 
eds., 2004). 
 10. Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New 
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 50-54 (2002) (discussing this phenomenon within the context of the U.S.-E.U. 
mutual recognition agreements); Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globaliza-
tion: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823 (2002) 
[hereinafter Accountable Governance]; Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmoniza-
tion, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692 (1998). 
 11. Kalypso Nicolaidis, Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual Recognition and the 
Free Movement of Professionals, in THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION PROCESS, 4 (Fiorella Kostoris and Padoa Schioppa eds., 2005) [hereinafter Nicolaidis, 
Human Faces]. 
112905 03_STEWART.DOC 1/10/2006  10:23 AM 
Summer/Autumn 2005] A MODEL FOR GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 67 
Non-state actors, including business and NGO representatives, participate 
in varying degrees in these three different types of global regulatory arrange-
ments.  In addition, the weaknesses of global government and the perceived 
need for regulatory harmonization have stimulated the development at the 
global level of private standard setting and regulatory organizations, such as the 
International Standards Organization, organized primarily or exclusively by 
business, and hybrid private-public regulatory regimes involving businesses, 
NGOs, and in some cases states or international organizations.12  While these 
global organizations often use administrative law tools to bolster their opera-
tion and legitimacy, they are beyond the scope of this Article.  Nor does this 
Article address another important element of global administrative law:  the 
development by international authorities, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body and international investment treaty tribunals of administrative law, of re-
quirements that governments must follow in domestic regulatory decisions with 
external consequences.13 
B. Vertical and Horizontal Linkages Within Global Regulatory Regimes 
Both formal treaty-based regimes and global regulatory networks operate 
through two-way vertical linkages between the domestic and international lev-
els. 
First, domestic officials represent their governments at the global level.  In 
formal regimes, a national delegation might involve representation of several 
ministries or departments, often headed by a foreign ministry official, struc-
tured through established protocols of supervision and review by the repre-
sented government.14  In global regulatory networks and the establishment of 
mutual recognition regimes, the representation process is typically far less struc-
tured and officials might represent only their own agency, affording them much 
greater freedom of action.  In addition to acting as representatives of their re-
spective governments in these various settings, officials also function as mem-
bers of the global regime, and might develop a personal stake in its success. 
Second, measures agreed at the global level are typically implemented 
through domestic regulatory regimes rather than directly by regulation of non-
state actors by the global regime.  Subject to a few but perhaps growing number 
of exceptions, treaty-based regimes lack authority directly to regulate the con-
duct of non-state actors.15  But, under a “statutory–adjudicatory” model of regu-
                                                          
 12. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 3, at 16. 
 13. See id. at 44; Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 14. Business and NGO representatives may also participate, both as members of delegations or as 
observers in international negotiation sessions.  See David A. Wirth, Public Participation in Interna-
tional Processes: Environmental Case Studies at the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 18-22 (1996).  Such participation is rarer in the case of informal regulatory net-
works. 
 15. Some of the exceptions are discussed in infra Section III. 
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latory governance,16 such regimes generate norms, including norms generated 
by regime administrative bodies; international law makes these norms legally 
binding on party states or creates other strong incentives for their domestic im-
plementation. 
Informal regulatory networks lack direct coercive regulatory authority over 
non-state actors, and the measures agreed to are not legally binding on states.  
Implementation at the domestic level of policies and measures agreed to by 
networks depends on and can generally be accomplished by the initiative of the 
relevant participating national officials, often through the exercise of their exist-
ing administrative authority, without the need for legislation or action by other 
government authorities.  This “regulatory convergence” model of governance 
typically operates without any formal transmission of legal provisions or deci-
sions from the international to the domestic level.17  Thus, the network of cen-
tral bank governors forming the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
agreed on new capital requirements for banks; the participating government 
officials then followed these harmonized measures in exercising their domestic 
administrative regulatory authority.18 
Horizontal arrangements for regulatory harmonization or cooperation 
through mutual recognition and equivalence determination arrangements fol-
low a different approach.  Each participating domestic actor, in regulating 
products and services originating in another country,  accepts or defers to their 
compliance with the other’s procedures and  standards as satisfying its own re-
quirements in light of memorialized or more informal mutual agreements or 
other indicia of expected reciprocity.19 
C. Transparency and Opportunities for Access and Participation 
Both treaty-based regimes and global regulatory networks typically function 
against the background of traditional diplomatic norms of confidentiality in ne-
gotiation.The transaction costs and other impediments to successful negotia-
tions are already high, especially for multilateral agreements, even if negotia-
tions are confidential.  Transparency could aggravate these impediments.  For 
example, confidentiality has been thought justified on the need to prevent 
threats to successful negotiations by domestic interest groups who might mobi-
lize to block, for example, trade liberalization.  In the case of regulatory agree-
ments, these agreements for confidentiality are reinforced by the premise that 
the issues involved are often technical and appropriately resolved by experts. 
                                                          
 16. See Daniel Tarullo, Law and Governance in a Global Economy, 93 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 
PROCEEDINGS 105, 109-11 (1999). 
 17. Id. at 109. 
 18. See Zaring, supra note 6, at 283-84. 
 19. Whereas, normally, mutual recognition agreements will be negotiated between governments, 
recent research indicates that in some areas such agreements will only be possible when at least one of 
the parties is a private professional association.  Nicolaidis & Steffenson, supra note 8, at 13. This is 
particularly true in the services sector, in which individual professions are regulated on sub-national 
levels, therefore making a government-to-government agreement difficult to reach.  Id. 
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Treaty-based regimes, however, operate in significant part through formal, 
public legal acts, and typically make decisions through established rules and 
processes, promoting transparency.  Non-state actors, including business and 
NGO representatives, may be part of national delegations and in many treaty-
based, international regulatory regimes enjoy observer status, allowing them to 
monitor negotiations and participate at an informal level.  Networks and hori-
zontal coordination arrangements, by contrast, operate much more informally, 
and their decisions and decisionmaking processes are generally significantly less 
transparent.  In considering the potential application of administrative law 
mechanisms to global regulatory regimes, it is thus important to understand 
what factors favor the use of either formal, treaty-based regimes or more in-
formal arrangements to address particular types of regulatory problems. 
D. Issues of Control, Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness: Do-
mestic and Global Perspectives 
The dramatic growth of powerful global regulatory regimes poses important 
governance issues of control, accountability, participation, and responsiveness.  
These questions can be viewed from either a domestic or a global perspective. 
From the domestic perspective, the three different types of international 
regulatory regimes described above have been attacked in the United States 
and elsewhere on the ground that they result in important changes in domestic 
law without being adequately subject to the domestic systems of political and 
legal accountability and control that would apply to purely domestic regulatory 
measures.  While treaties require ratification, treaty-based regimes increasingly 
adopt regulatory measures through subsidiary lawmaking authorities, including 
the conference of the parties, administrative bodies, and dispute settlement 
bodies.  Further, new regulatory norms adopted by international regulatory re-
gimes, whether treaty-based or network, can often be implemented by execu-
tive branch agencies under their existing statutory authorities without the need 
for new legislation.  Implementation of global regulatory norms by domestic 
agencies through rulemaking or adjudication might in some cases be subject to 
domestic administrative law procedures and judicial review, but the underlying 
norm was adopted through supranational processes that are often not.20  Some 
binding international norms adopted by treaty-based regimes might allow no or 
only limited discretion in domestic implementation, short-circuiting the role of 
domestic administrative law.  In other cases, especially in horizontal methods of 
regulatory cooperation, domestic implementation is accomplished though in-
formal determinations or exercises of enforcement discretion that are not sub-
ject to procedural requirements and, especially in the case of enforcement dis-
cretion, are also not ordinarily subject to judicial review.21  Moreover, even 
                                                          
 20. See Eleanor Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and 
Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 425-32 (2002). 
 21. See Linda Horton, supra note 10, at 710-25; Sidney Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, 
Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADM. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (2002) [hereinafter In-
ternational Trade Agreements]. 
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when domestic administrative law disciplines are applicable, they generally ap-
ply only to domestic implementation and not to the global component, which is 
often by far the more important in terms of the regulatory outcome. 
Critics accordingly contend that the norms, policies, and practices adopted 
by global regulatory regimes are not subject to adequate political, public, and 
legal accountability.  The criticisms have both procedural and substantive com-
ponents and focus on either domestic or global level implications.  Regarding 
procedure, treaty-based regimes like the WTO and the IMF have been widely 
attacked for imposing measures generated by secret processes without oppor-
tunity for participation and review by affected domestic interests.  The dis-
placement of domestic processes of regulatory accountability is most obvious in 
the case of international treaty-based regimes whose norms are domestically 
binding or that must be incorporated in domestic law.  While less salient, similar 
displacement effects from the decisions of regulatory networks and horizontal 
cooperative regimes is also increasingly under fire.22  Examples include the deci-
sion by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to grant equivalency 
status to the Australian Meat Safety Enhancement Program,23 and the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to issue equivalence determi-
nations under the U.S.–E.U. Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on phar-
maceuticals without allowing for stakeholder input.24 
Process-based criticisms of the domestic impact of international regulation 
are joined with a substantive attack—that the absence of adequate mechanisms 
of transparency, accountability, and control enables well-organized industrial 
and financial interests to “capture” the two-level, global and domestic regula-
tory decisionmaking process to the detriment of the environment, consumers, 
workers, and general social values and interests.  Thus, “[i]nternational negotia-
tions sometimes enable government leaders to do what they privately wish to 
do, but are powerless to do domestically.”25  The vehement criticism by envi-
ronmental and other NGOs in the United States and abroad of regulatory deci-
sions by WTO and NAFTA tribunals, the IMF, the World Bank, and other in-
ternational bodies is a virtual replay of Ralph Nader’s attacks on U.S. federal 
regulatory agencies in the 1960s.  Indeed, Nader is still around, making criti-
cisms of the WTO that are virtually the same as those he levied against the 
                                                          
 22. Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 832-35 (critiquing the use of 
mutual recognition agreements and equivalency determination and providing examples of several 
potential problems that their use may cause).  For an activist critique of mutual recognition agreements 
as a strategy for harmonization, see TRANS-ATL. CONSUMER DIALOGUE, TACD BRIEFING PAPER ON 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS (MRAS) (2001) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
available at http://www.tacd.org/db_files/files/ files-270-filetag.doc (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).   
 23. Australian Meat, supra note 9; see Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 842-43. 
 24. See Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 853-54. 
 25. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 427, 457 (1988), quoted in Zaring, supra note 6, at 321.  See generally Gregory Shaffer, WTO 
Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages 
for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 608, 609 n.5 (2000). 
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Federal Trade Commission thirty-five years ago.26  Some analysts have gone so 
far as to argue that the rise of global regulation amounts to a fundamental al-
teration of the constitutional and governmental system in the United States by 
creating a largely unaccountable “international branch” of the federal govern-
ment that presents challenges comparable to those posed by the New Deal 
regulatory state.27 
Other critics focus on the deficiencies of governance at the level of the 
global regulatory regime, rather than on the weakening or circumvention of 
domestic mechanisms of political and legal control and accountability.  They 
make both process and substantive criticisms similar to those levied by their 
domestically oriented counterparts.  Process-based criticism tends to focus on 
the secrecy of international and transnational regulatory decisional processes 
and the lack of adequate opportunity for effective access to information, par-
ticipation and input in global regulatory decisionmaking on the part of affected 
global or domestic publics, including the interests of environmentalists, work-
ers, consumers, developing countries, and indigenous peoples.  Associated sub-
stantive criticisms are that the international regulatory process is dominated by 
well-organized economic interests and powerful countries like the United 
States, often resulting in inadequate regulatory protection and economic injus-
tice.28 
These dangers are acknowledged by students of global regulatory govern-
ance.29  They find that these arrangements, by making regulation a multi-
jurisdictional, two-level or horizontal game, generate serious information 
asymmetries, create significant agency costs, and increase the severity of the 
collective action problems faced by unorganized “public” interests, thereby 
serving to “filter” such interests and thus systematically disadvantage “larger 
and politically weak groups” such as workers, the poor, the uneducated, or the 
vulnerable.30 
E. Potential Administrative Law Responses 
One means of addressing these problems is the development of more effec-
tive and appropriate systems of administrative law to discipline and to hold ac-
countable international regulatory decisionmaking and its domestic implemen-
tation. 
One approach is the “bottom up” approach, extending the reach of domes-
tic administrative law to assert more effective control and review with respect to 
                                                          
 26. See Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY ix (1999) (preface by Ralph Nader attacking 
“an autocratic system of international governance that favors corporate interests”). 
 27. Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 
(2000). 
 28. See, e.g., Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 828. 
 29. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 25; Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, supra note 21; 
Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, supra note 6. 
 30. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Admin-
istrative Law in International Institution, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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the supranational elements of domestic regulation.  Thus, U.S. courts dealing 
with domestic agency decisions implementing global regulatory norms and poli-
cies might seek to extend the administrative law procedural requirements and 
techniques of judicial review applicable to purely domestic measures to include 
the participation of U.S. regulatory officials in the global development of the 
standards or other measures adopted domestically.  For example, they might 
require U.S. regulators to afford public notice and comment before entering 
into global regulatory discussions and negotiations.  U.S. agencies might be re-
quired to include a summary of the global regulatory discussions and decisions 
in the notice of a proposed new rule implementing a global regulatory norm 
and to provide an analysis and justification of the agencies’ role in those global 
discussions and decisions in the final decision.  Much more boldly, domestic 
courts might refuse to recognize the decisions or norms of global regulatory re-
gimes reached through decisionmaking processes that did not satisfy basic stan-
dards of regulatory due process.  Other participating nations might impose simi-
lar requirements, which might coalesce and ripen into transnational administra-
tive law. 
Alternatively, under a “top down” approach, a treaty-based regime or even 
a network or horizontal regulatory regime would adopt decisionmaking proce-
dures to promote greater transparency and opportunities for participation and 
input from affected interests and would establish reviewing bodies or other 
mechanisms to promote accountability with respect to international or transna-
tional regulatory decisions.  Especially in this context, we would need to liber-
ate ourselves from a court-centered conception of administrative law.  Interna-
tional practice has already begun to generate a variety of different approaches: 
the World Bank inspection panel,31 the procedures of the NAFTA Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation,32 and the inclusion of NGOs in decisionmaking 
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission on international food safety standards 
and under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.33 
In assessing the potential for these and other strategies,34 we must frankly 
recognize the challenge in developing administrative law mechanisms for global 
regulation that will fulfill the negative (power checking) or affirmative (power 
                                                          
 31. See generally Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case 
of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 553 (1994). 
 32. See generally Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment—The North Ameri-
can Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183 (1998); Gillian Dale, III. NAFTA: 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 1996 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 26 (1996). 
 33. For discussions regarding NGO participation at Codex Alimentarius meetings, see Lori M. 
Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International 
Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823, 836-38 (2002); Robert F. Housman, Democratiz-
ing International Trade Decisionmaking, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 699, 718-20 (1994).  For discussions 
regarding NGO participation in the context of other international treaties and organizations, see 
Daniel Vice, Note, Implementation of Biodiversity Treaties: Monitoring, Fact-Finding, and Dispute 
Resolution, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 577, 616-9 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Note, The “Participatory 
Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 547-48 (1997). 
 34. The E.U. comitology process provides another institutional model that might be adopted to the 
global context.  See generally EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian 
Joerges & Ellen Vos, eds., 1999). 
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directing) functions that administrative law serves in a wholly domestic setting.  
Domestically, regulatory agencies generally operate at only one remove from 
elected legislatures and in the shadow of review by independent courts.  Inter-
national regulatory networks and organizations operate at much greater re-
move from elected legislatures, and reviewing courts are generally absent.  
There are good reasons for traditional diplomatic norms of secrecy and confi-
dentiality negotiation and for the use of informal models of global regulatory 
governance.  Moreover, in many global regulatory regimes regulatory functions 
have not (yet) crystallized into distinct administrative bodies that could be more 
readily governed by administrative law. 
II 
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In the United States and other liberal democratic industrialized nations, 
administrative regulation is itself regulated by administrative law.  It defines the 
structural position of administrative agencies within the governmental system, 
specifies the decisional procedures that they must follow, and determines the 
availability and scope of review of their actions by the independent judiciary.  It 
furnishes a common set of principles and procedures that cut horizontally 
across the many different substantive fields of administration and regulation.  In 
the United States, the system of federal administrative law has evolved signifi-
cantly over the past forty years.35 
A. Basic Elements of U.S. Federal Administrative Law 
The system of administration in the United States, like that in many Euro-
pean and other nations, has certain structural elements that are fundamental:   
(1) an elected legislative body that enacts statutes and delegates their imple-
mentation to executive officials; (2) an administrative body—a discrete, respon-
sible decisionmaking entity, subordinate to and deriving authority from the leg-
islature, that implements the relevant law through adjudication, rulemaking, or 
other forms of administrative decision; (3) an independent court or a tribunal 
that reviews the agency decisions for conformance with the terms of the statu-
tory delegation and other applicable legal requirements; and (4) decisional 
transparency including public access to government records.36 
The four basic components of U.S. federal administrative law are contained 
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA): procedural requirements for 
agency decisionmaking, threshold requirements for the availability of judicial 
review, principles defining the scope of judicial review, and provisions regarding 
public access to agency information.37 
                                                          
 35. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 448-51 (2003). 
 36. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Govern-
ance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 369, 370-76 (2001); Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, supra note 35. 
 37. 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 7521 (2004). 
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The APA provides two basic types of procedures for agency decisionmak-
ing:  notice and comment rulemaking, and formal adjudication through trial- 
type hearings.  These procedures generate an administrative record that serves 
as the exclusive basis for agency decision and judicial review.  They, together 
with the Freedom of Information Act, provide transparency by generating ex-
tensive, publicly available records of the factual, analytic, and policy positions 
of the agency and of outside parties as well as the basis for the agency’s deci-
sion.38 
The APA authorizes courts to review four basic types of issues:  the 
agency’s compliance with applicable procedural requirements; the sufficiency of 
the record evidence to support agency factual determinations; whether the 
agency’s action is in conformity with applicable constitutional and statutory au-
thorizations, requirements, and limitations, and other applicable law; and 
whether the agency’s exercise of discretion pursuant to governing law is “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”39 
B. The Traditional Model of Administrative Law and Subsequent Develop-
ments 
The core of administrative law in the United States has focused on securing 
the rule of law, respecting private rights, and protecting the liberty and property 
of citizens by ensuring, through procedural requirements and judicial review, 
that agencies act within constitutional limitations and the bounds of the statu-
tory authority delegated by the legislature.40  The traditional subject of adminis-
trative law is government issuance or enforcement of an order imposing regula-
tory requirements or liabilities on a specific person.  Here the function of ad-
ministrative law is primarily negative:  to prevent unlawful or arbitrary adminis-
trative exercise of coercive power against private persons.  This is to ensure ac-
countability for the legality of administrative decisions.  This function is rooted 
in principles of democratic self-government:  the liberty or property of citizens 
should be subject to restriction by government only when the citizenry has au-
thorized such restrictions through the processes of electoral representation and 
subject to the constitutional limitations and procedures adopted by the citi-
zenry.41 
In recent decades, U.S. administrative law has assumed a broader scope and 
function through the development of an interest-representation model of ad-
ministrative law.  It has developed new and more inclusive procedural require-
                                                          
 38. See STEPHEN BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND MATTHEW SPITZER, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 652-60, 685-99, 872-86 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 
BREYER & STEWART]. 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (2004). 
 40. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1671-76 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation]; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public 
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1982). 
 41. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 40, at 1672-73. 
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ments and has promoted transparency in administrative decisionmaking, includ-
ing rulemaking.  It has expanded the right to participate in agency decisionmak-
ing procedures and the scope of judicial review to include a broad range of af-
fected social and economic interests beyond those regulated.  The scope of judi-
cial review has been expanded to include, in addition, substantial review of 
agencies’ exercise of policy discretion.  Here administrative law has assumed 
the affirmative task of ensuring that regulatory agencies exercise their policy-
making discretion in a manner that is informed and responsive to the wide 
range of social and economic interests and values affected by their decisions, 
including the beneficiaries of regulatory programs as well as those subject to 
regulatory controls and sanctions.42  The functions of administrative law go be-
yond the core of ensuring legal accountability to the broader goal of promoting 
responsiveness and securing accountability to social interests and values. 
The interest representation model implicitly recognizes the inherent limita-
tions of an administrative law limited to a conception of democracy based solely 
on electoral representation.  The extent of power exercised by administrative 
agencies and the breadth of the discretion that they enjoy under many statutory 
delegations means that the system of electoral representation can afford only a 
limited degree of accountability for their decisions.  Broad statutory delegations 
enable agencies to escape any such tight agent-principal link and leave them 
with a large residual discretion that, on the traditional model, is not legally ac-
countable.  The interest-representation model seeks to fill this gap by creating a 
surrogate process of representation through legal procedures rather than 
through electoral mechanisms and to expand the scope of judicial review to in-
clude close scrutiny of agency exercises of discretion.  Because of the heavy 
emphasis placed by reviewing courts on the requirement that agencies address 
and respond to the material submissions of all participating interests and pro-
vide a reasoned justification for the balance struck among them, this aspect of 
administrative law reflects a deliberative conception of democracy. 
The judiciary is the vital cockpit in administering this conception.  For ex-
ample, in applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review of agency 
discretion, the courts do not substitute their own judgment regarding sound pol-
icy for those of the agency.  Instead, they seek to promote a form of dialogic 
rationality in the administrative process by requiring the agency to articulate 
and justify its exercises of power by reference to legally relevant public norms 
invoked by outside parties and the agency itself, and by examining the suffi-
ciency of the agencies’ responses to the data, analysis, and comments submitted 
by outside parties and the justifications that it gives for its policy choices.43 
                                                          
 42. See id. at 1711-60; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 636-43 (2000). 
 43. See BREYER & STEWART, supra note 38, at 415-88. 
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III 
“BOTTOM UP” APPROACHES TO  
DEVELOPING A GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A global administrative law can also be created from the “bottom up” 
through application of domestic administrative law to the decisions of three 
types of global regulatory regimes—international treaty-based regimes, transna-
tional regulatory networks, and horizontal arrangements for mutual recognition 
and cooperative equivalence determinations.  The U.S. model of administrative 
law provides an example.  One possibility is to apply U.S. administrative law 
directly to decisions or other actions by global regulatory regimes.  Another is 
to apply administrative law disciplines to domestic implementation of global 
regulatory norms.  A third is to apply such disciplines to the participation by 
U.S. administrative officials in the decisionmaking of global regulatory regimes. 
A. Application of U.S. Administrative Law Directly to Actions of Interna-
tional Regulatory Regimes 
As previously noted, global regulatory regimes generally do not have au-
thority to determine or enforce requirements or liabilities directly against indi-
viduals or other non-state actors.  But instances of such authority are likely to 
grow as international regulation intensifies, as analogous experience with direct 
regulation in the E.U. suggests.  A current example is the Executive Board of 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, which 
determines whether energy or other projects to reduce greenhouse gases emis-
sions that are undertaken by project sponsors in developing countries but fi-
nanced by, among others, firms in developed countries are eligible to receive 
commercially valuable GHG emissions reduction credits.  If this and similar 
market-based global regulatory systems are to succeed, they must provide in-
vestors with a degree of legal certainty, including timely resolution of disputes.  
Although the determinations of the CDM Executive Board have vital conse-
quences for project developers and investors, they are afforded no procedural 
rights at the Board level and no opportunity for review of Board decisions by an 
independent tribunal.44 
Another example is the U.N. Security Council 1267 Committee, established 
and authorized by the U.N. Security Council to list persons determined to be 
engaged in financing international terrorism.  The Security Council resolution 
establishing the committee obligates U.N. member states to freeze the assets of 
listed persons.  There is no procedure available before the committee whereby 
persons listed have the right to challenge the correctness of a listing, although 
such persons listed have challenged domestic asset freezes implementing the 
listings in domestic courts.45  As a third example, the U.N. High Commissioner 
                                                          
 44. See Ernestine E. Meijer, The Clean Development Mechanism: Loss in a “Win-Win” Instrument 
(unpublished article, on file with the author). 
 45. See David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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for Refugees (UNCR) makes determinations about refugee status of individu-
als without an established system of procedural rights for claimants and admin-
isters camps for refugees, who have complained of sexual abuse and other seri-
ous wrongdoing by UNCR employees and contractors, without an established 
mechanism for redress.46 
In the absence of any effective remedy at the level of the global regime, do-
mestic courts in the United States and other countries might seek to review the 
legality, procedural and/or substantive, of international regulatory and other 
administrative decisions that directly affect specific persons.  While the U.N. 
and other international organizations and their officials regularly plead official 
immunity when sued in domestic courts, if such organizations themselves fail to 
provide effective accountability for seriously erroneous, arbitrary, or abusive 
decisions or actions by their officials and employees, domestic courts might start 
to chip away at immunity.47 
If a claimant brought suit in a U.S. federal court, the boldest possibility 
would be for courts to hold that the international regulatory regime is a de facto 
federal agency to which effective decisionmaking power has been delegated by 
treaty or otherwise, so that the procedural and other requirements of the APA 
apply directly to that regime.48  Such a step would be so deeply inconsistent with 
the reluctance of courts to intrude on the conduct by the Executive of foreign 
affairs that it has no practical chance of adoption.  Nonetheless, without relying 
on the APA, federal courts could apply constitutional requirements of proce-
dural due process and other generally applicable principles of administrative 
law to review decisions of global authorities that directly and adversely affect 
individual persons, and provide relief through injunctions and declaratory judg-
ments. 
Tort remedies are another possible mechanism of review and redress.  Tort 
claims have, for example, been asserted in India against asserted negligence by 
UNICEF employees in the distribution and administration of vaccines, which 
assertedly caused medical injuries to those receiving the vaccines.49 
                                                          
 46. Mark Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
 47. Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN Peacekeep-
ing Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2002) (discussing recent moves by the United Nations to limit 
the use of immunity when serious breach of law is alleged); Jennifer Murray, Note, Who Will Police the 
Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian 
Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 475 (2003) (discussing the abuse of the immunity doctrine by U.N. personnel involved in peace-
keeping missions). 
 48. A court would have to conclude that the global authority was an “agency” for purposes of the 
APA, which defines “agency” as “each authority of the government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 
551(1) (2004). 
 49. UNICEF: Court Finds UNICEF and Government Responsible for Child Deaths in Assam, 
ACR WEEKLY NEWSLETTER (Asia Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong, China), Nov. 12, 2003, 
(on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/0153/242/ (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005).   
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If domestic courts began to review and provide remedies against decisions 
of global regulatory regimes, the regimes would have strong incentives to de-
velop effective internal systems of administrative law in order to defend or de-
ter such initiatives.  For example, athletes have brought domestic court actions  
against anti-doping and other disciplinary decisions by international sports fed-
erations.  In response, the sports federations have developed a fairly elaborate 
system of procedural rights for athletes charged with wrongdoing and review by 
an independent tribunal.  Thus, “bottom up” review by domestic courts might 
stimulate “top down” administrative law initiatives by global regimes. 
B. Application of U.S. Administrative Law to Domestic Implementation of 
International Regulatory Norms 
Federal regulatory officials regularly serve on U.S. delegations to treaty-
based regimes, participate in transnational regulatory networks, or negotiate 
mutual recognition arrangements.  Subsequently, they implement the resulting 
global regime norms and arrangements at the domestic level.  For example, in 
order to carry out their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, federal agencies increasingly adopt international stan-
dards as the basis for food safety regulations.50  Alternatively, implementation 
of global regulatory norms takes the form of enforcement or other adjudicatory 
decisions in individual cases.  For example, under international regulatory re-
gimes of mutual recognition or equivalency, the FDA often decides whether to 
authorize or take enforcement action against the import of a medical device 
product that complies with domestic regulatory requirements in the exporting 
state, based on a determination of whether those requirements are equivalent 
to those in the United States.51 
United States administrative officials thus have both an “external” and an 
“internal” role; they are part of both national and global systems of regulatory 
government.52  A critical issue is the extent to which procedural requirements 
and judicial review of domestic implementation might reach back to consider 
the development and basis of the global regulatory norms that are being im-
plemented.  The officials participating in the adoption of a global regulatory 
                                                          
 50. David Livshiz, SPS, International Standards, Domestic Implementation, and Public Participa-
tion: Can the Stars Align? 7-8 (Jan. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  For exam-
ples see Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities, 
70 Fed. Reg. 460, 505-06 (Jan. 4, 2005) (justifying the risk assessment for the proposed regulation as 
complying with the requirements demanded by the Codex and OIE); Bromoxynil, Diclofop-methyl, 
Dicofol, Diquat, Etridiazole, et al.; Proposed Tolerance Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 47051, 47055 (Aug. 4, 
2004) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (justifying a change in regulations to make them compliant 
with standards developed by Codex). 
 51. Livshiz, supra note 50, at 12-14. For examples see Australian Meat, supra note 9 (finding Aus-
tralia’s system of meat inspection equivalent); Mutual Recognition of Pharmaceutical Good Manufac-
turing Practice Inspection Reports, Medical Device Quality System Audit Reports, and Certain Medi-
cal Device Product Evaluation Reports Between the United States and the European Community, 63 
Fed. Reg. 60122 (Nov. 6, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 26) (providing for mutual recognition of 
good manufacturing practice (GMP) inspection reports for pharmaceuticals provided by signatory 
countries). 
 52. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 171-81. 
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norm will most likely be strongly committed to its implementation, and the jus-
tifications given by an agency for its domestic decision might be rationalizations 
of a fait accompli.  Unless the record considered by the court and the reasons 
given by the agency encompass the global elements of decisionmaking, domes-
tic administrative law might provide little in the way of meaningful accountabil-
ity. 
In addressing these issues, one should ask whether U.S. agency decisions 
that implement international agreements should be subject to the same proce-
dural requirements and principles regarding the availability and scope of judi-
cial review as similar regulatory decisions that are purely domestic in character.  
There are three possible answers to this question.  Decisions implementing in-
ternational agreements might be subject to the same requirements as purely 
domestic decisions (“parity”).  They might be subject to fewer requirements 
(“parity minus”).  Or, they might be subject to greater requirements (“parity 
plus”). 
1. The Paradigm of Parity 
Subject to a limited statutory exception in the case of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, discussed below, nothing in the APA indicates that 
domestic agency actions in implementing global norms are exempt from APA 
requirements or subject to a lesser standard of judicial review than comparable 
purely domestic decisions.  While the APA provides wholesale exemptions 
from all of its provisions for certain military functions,53 no similar exemptions 
apply to agency actions relating to foreign affairs. 
The paradigm of parity holds that agency decisions implementing global 
regulatory norms should be subject to the same administrative law procedures, 
requirements, and review on the same basis as equivalent, purely domestic 
agency actions.  There are a number of court decisions that reflect this ap-
proach:  United States v. Decker,54 upholding, in the context of a criminal prose-
cution, the judicial reviewability of U.S. fishing regulations issued pursuant to 
the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Convention; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
United States,55 holding that U.S. agency suspension of countervailing subsidies 
investigation pursuant to U.S.–Korean agreement is subject to notice and com-
ment rulemaking; and, although subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, 
Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation,56 in which the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Department of Transportation was required to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and conduct a Clean Air Act con-
formity determination in issuing regulations that would permit Mexican motor 
carriers to operate in the United States. 
                                                          
 53. See 5 U.S.C § 551(F), (G) (2004). 
 54. 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 55. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001). 
 56. 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d 541 U.S. 752 (2004).  For a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, see infra text accompanying note 82. 
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Under a parity paradigm, some forms of agency implementation of interna-
tional decisions will not be subject to procedural requirements or judicial re-
view because equivalent, purely domestic decisions are not.  For example, un-
der the APA, an administrative decision whether to initiate enforcement pro-
ceedings in a given case is not judicially reviewable when relevant statutes (as is 
generally the case) do not specify any requirements or criteria for such deci-
sions; in such cases, enforcement decisions are deemed to have been “commit-
ted to agency discretion by law.”57  Thus, decisions by the FDA or USDA not to 
take enforcement action against imported products in connection with interna-
tional mutual recognition and other regulatory equivalence arrangements will 
generally not be subject to judicial review unless the arrangement has been 
formalized in a regulation or other measure that is legally binding on the agency 
and the agency’s action is claimed to violate it.58  Similarly, agency guidance and 
similar policy documents that do not purport to have the force of law are gener-
ally not subject to notice and comment rulemaking requirements or, in many 
cases, to judicial review.  Thus, agency use of such documents or other informal 
means to implement global regulatory norms or cooperative arrangements will 
likewise not be subject to those disciplines. 
Further, under a parity paradigm, the facts and circumstances involved in 
the development of the global regulatory norms that the agency is implement-
ing and the agency’s role in their development might not be subject to review.  
In reviewing agency rules, courts generally limit themselves to the record gen-
erated after rulemaking has been formally noticed and initiated by the agency.  
Prior informal discussions between the agency and interested persons, which 
might play a decisive role in shaping the proposed and final rule, are generally 
not part of the relevant record before the court and are thus not considered by 
it.59  Similarly, the informal background of licensing or enforcement decisions by 
agencies is generally not accessible or considered on judicial review.  Given this 
precedent, courts following a paradigm of parity might very well refuse to delve 
into global events that occurred before the initiation of domestic decisionmak-
ing processes by the agency, leaving out what is often the most crucial part. 
The parity paradigm is also restricted by the APA provision exempting 
“foreign affairs functions” from the notice and comment procedures otherwise 
applicable to rulemaking and the trial-type hearing requirements otherwise ap-
plicable to formal adjudication.60  The legislative background indicates that this 
exemption should be limited to those matters that “so affect relations with 
other governments that, for example, public [agency decisionmaking processes] 
                                                          
 57. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2004); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 58. When the decision is to enforce, the importer, of course, will generally have a right of review 
on the merits but not of the decision to take the enforcement action as such. 
 59. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that contacts received 
prior to the issuance of formal notice of proposed rulemaking need not necessarily be disclosed). 
 60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4) (2004). 
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would clearly provoke undesirable international consequences.”61  Courts have 
nonetheless tended to interpret it fairly broadly to cover the implementation of 
international economic and regulatory agreements.62  But in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act, Congress restored parity in the specific, politically sali-
ent context of agency responses to decisions by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body finding U.S. regulations to be contrary to WTO Uruguay Round Agree-
ments.  Before modifying such a regulation, the relevant agency must provide 
public notice and opportunity for comment and justify any change in relation to 
the comments received. In addition, the USTR must consult with specified con-
gressional committees and obtain the views of relevant private sector advisory 
committees.63 
2. The Paradigm of Parity Minus 
This approach holds that domestic administrative decisions should not be 
subject to the same procedural requirements or to the same availability and 
scope of judicial review as purely domestic decisions.  Its rationale is that exces-
sive legalization and procedural formality will compromise confidentiality in 
international negotiations and otherwise impair the ability of the executive to 
conclude and promptly implement international agreements.  Prompt and effi-
cient implementation is necessary to secure the credibility of the executive in 
international negotiations.  Also, opportunities for delay through procedural 
formalities or judicial review will enable domestic economic interests to block 
or delay implementation of international agreements that benefit the country 
and impair cooperative relations with other nations.  Since the executive can, as 
a general matter, conduct and conclude international agreements without being 
subject to the constraints of domestic administrative law, it should also enjoy 
significant flexibility when taking the domestic steps necessary to implement 
these agreements. 
This paradigm finds support in a number of court decisions.  For example, in 
Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA),64 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a challenge by U.S. fishing boats to regulations issued by the International 
Pacific Halibut Commission and approved by the Secretary of State (who was 
delegated such authority by the President) were not subject to judicial review 
on the ground that presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is committed 
to agency discretion by law.65  Similarly, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
                                                          
 61. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 26 
(1947) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/agtc.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).  
 62. See C. Jeffrey Tribbels, Delineating the Foreign Affairs Function in the Age of Globalization, 23 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV 389, 395-97 (1999). 
 63. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2004). 
 64. 512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 65. The court invoked Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), 
which held that determinations by the CAB and the President’s determination of international airline 
route service authorizations and recommendations by the CAB regarding such awards were not subject 
to judicial review.  Id. at 1190; see also Z. & F. Assets Realization Co. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941) 
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v. Pena66 invoked the “foreign affairs function” exemption in the APA rulemak-
ing provisions to reject a claim by U.S. truck drivers that the Department of 
Transportation was required to follow notice and comment procedures in issu-
ing regulations authorizing Mexican truck drivers to drive in the United States 
based on driver licensing equivalency.  The court’s ruling might well have been 
influenced by a perception that liberalization in trade and services is generally 
beneficial and by a reluctance to provide opponents with procedural weapons 
to fight it.67 
The paradigm of “parity minus” is also reflected in Public Citizen v. United 
States Trade Representative (USTR),68 holding that USTR was not required to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the negotiation of NAFTA on 
the ground that there would be no final agency action unless and until the nego-
tiations were successfully concluded.  At that point, the agreement would be 
submitted by the President to Congress for approval, an action that is also not 
subject to judicial review, with the result that judicial review is not available at 
any stage.  Likewise, Public Citizen v. Kantor held that the USTR’s negotiation 
of the GATT Uruguay Round was not subject to judicial review under the 
APA.69  And in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation (DOT),70 the Su-
preme Court held that in issuing regulations implementing NAFTA and rele-
vant federal statutes to authorize operation of Mexican trucks in the United 
States, DOT was not required to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) and make a Clean Air Act conformity determination.  The Court rea-
soned that the combination of NAFTA obligations and relevant federal statutes 
left DOT with no choice but to grant the authorization; hence an EIS and a con-
formity determination were unnecessary.  This decision makes clear how global 
regulatory norms can short-circuit otherwise applicable domestic administrative 
law processes. 
3. The Paradigm of Parity Plus 
A third approach would subject domestic administrative decisions imple-
menting international regulatory norms to more demanding administrative law 
discipline than equivalent purely domestic actions.  The basic justification 
would be that the norms being implemented were chosen through global deci-
sionmaking processes that are more remote, opaque, and closed than equiva-
lent, purely domestic processes and therefore less subject to political and other 
mechanisms of accountability, justifying more demanding accountability 
through administrative law as a compensating corrective.71  Thus, global regula-
                                                                                                                                                        
(holding that decisions by Secretaries of Treasury and State to certify awards pursuant to determina-
tions of U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission are not subject to judicial review). 
 66. 17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 67. See Judith L. Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic 
Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000); Benvenisti, supra note 30. 
 68. 976 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 69. 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 70. 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 
 71. See Wirth, supra note 14. 
112905 03_STEWART.DOC 1/10/2006  10:23 AM 
Summer/Autumn 2005] A MODEL FOR GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 83 
tory decisionmaking often occurs in distant locations such as Basel or Geneva.  
Transnational “club” mechanisms in global regulatory regimes make it very dif-
ficult for concerned interests in the United States, and especially for less well-
organized consumer, environmental, and other “public” interests, to acquire the 
information and to organize effectively in order to influence such decisions.  
Also, U.S. administrative officials may use informal negotiations and coordi-
nated regulatory policy initiatives with regulators in other countries to enhance 
their own independence from otherwise applicable U.S. domestic political 
checks.72 
How might “parity plus” be implemented within the scope of the procedural 
and judicial review requirements of the APA in order to offset these systemic 
factors?  A key objective would be to enhance the transparency of the facts, 
analyses, and considerations that underlie global regulatory decisions in order 
to expose them to public scrutiny and contestation and to enable courts to apply 
requirements of reasoned justification, based on an adequate record, for the 
regulatory choices made.73  The operating premise is that open deliberations and 
transparency tend to “level the playing field,” alleviate information asymme-
tries, and check the influence of narrow interest groups in favor of broader but  
less well-organized constituencies.74 
In order to implement “parity plus,” procedural requirements and judicial 
review would be directed not only at a federal agency’s implementation of the 
global norm, but would extend to the norm itself and the process of its adop-
tion, even in cases in which analogous earlier stage agency decisionmaking in 
the purely domestic context would not be subject to such disciplines.  Thus, in 
cases in which domestic implementation involves formal adjudication or notice 
and comment rulemaking, courts might require the agency to submit for the 
record evidentiary materials on the global decisionmaking and its stated reasons 
why the international norms in question were adopted.  The agency might be 
required to explain why the relevant agency officials agreed, in their “external” 
capacity as participants in the global decisional process, to the norms adopted 
and what commitments they made regarding domestic U.S. implementation.  
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) might also be used to obtain discov-
ery of agency records relevant to the international negotiations.75  The justifica-
tion for these steps would be that they are necessary in order for a court ade-
quately to review the agency’s domestic decision by enabling it to take into ac-
                                                          
 72. See Zaring, supra note 6. 
 73. The extent of need for such measures will presumably vary depending on the extent of trans-
parency and accessibility of the international regulatory regime, including whether it is a network or 
more formal treaty-based regime; these variations may influence the degree of intrusiveness in courts’ 
application of hard look review. 
 74. Benvenisti, supra note 30, at 323-24. 
 75. FOIA provides a “deliberative privilege” exemption that might be invoked by the government 
to withhold records pertaining to global regulatory matters from disclosure.  It also provides an exemp-
tion for matters that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and properly classified under that or-
der.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (5) (2004). 
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count the underlying global norms, circumstances, and considerations.  Also, 
the enhanced transparency resulting from such steps could energize legislative 
and other political oversight.  The government, of course, would strongly resist 
any such initiative as an unwarranted interference with the Executive’s conduct 
of foreign relations and with needed informality and confidentiality in interna-
tional negotiations. 
A parity plus approach would reject the limitations on the availability of ju-
dicial review and agency procedures adopted by the courts following a parity 
minus approach, and the scope of review would extend significantly beyond that 
applied by courts under a parity paradigm.  In many cases doctrines of review-
ability and ripeness would have to be relaxed in order for a court to undertake 
review of the global components of agency decisions.  No court has yet taken 
this path.  But the ever-increasing importance of global regulation, growing 
criticism of both the procedural and substantive elements of global regulatory 
decisionmaking, and the concomitant erosion of domestic political and legal 
mechanisms of accountability might well lead the courts to take the initiative, 
much as they did in the 1960s in response to similar criticisms of domestic regu-
latory decisionmaking. 
C. Extending U.S. Administrative Law to U.S. Participation in International 
Regulatory Regime Decisionmaking 
A potential supplement or alternative to the steps outlined above would be 
to extend federal administrative law disciplines directly to agency officials’ par-
ticipation in global regulatory decisionmaking, whether through treaty-based 
regimes, regulatory networks, or transnational cooperation regarding mutual 
recognition or regulatory equivalency.  Even an ambitious approach to judicial 
review of domestic implementation of global regulatory norms would not allow 
the public to have notice of, to comment on, or to have an opportunity to par-
ticipate or influence the decisional process at the global level where the control-
ling decisions are often made.76 
One possibility for achieving this goal would be for courts to treat federal 
agency officials participating in international regulatory decisionmaking as an 
agency for APA purposes and to hold that they are therefore subject to APA 
procedural requirements and judicial review with respect to such participation.  
The APA and general principles of federal administrative law, however, afford 
little or no purchase for such an initiative.  Judicial deference to the Executive’s 
conduct of foreign affairs is a major additional obstacle.  Thus, as previously 
discussed, federal administrative agencies have great latitude to consult infor-
mally with other governmental or private parties and develop rulemaking op-
tions and proposals before undertaking the public comment process.  Similar 
                                                          
 76. Federal agencies entering into international regulatory agreements with counterparts must 
clear these agreements with the State Department and notify Congress pursuant to the Case-Zablocki 
Act, but this notification occurs only after the agreement has been concluded.  See Horton, supra note 
10, at 713. 
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principles apply to agency licensing and enforcement decisions.  Furthermore, 
APA law would normally fail to provide a basis for obtaining immediate judi-
cial review of an agency’s international-level decision to agree to a regulatory 
norm.  Even if informal agreement by high agency officials to an international 
norm were regarded as an agency decision, litigants could generally not satisfy 
requirements of standing and ripeness prior to adoption of a domestic imple-
menting measure that adversely affects them. 
Accordingly, new statutes or executive initiatives would be needed in order 
to extend domestic administrative law disciplines to agency participation in in-
ternational regulatory decisionmaking.  Although there is little prospect of ex-
tending judicial review directly to global regulatory decisions, procedural re-
quirements for agency participation in international regulatory negotiations 
have already been adopted in certain instances, including the following: 
1. Notice and Opportunity for Comment in Advance of Agency Participa-
tion in International Regulatory Negotiations 
The FDA and USDA are subject to a statutory requirement to notify the 
public about international “sanitary or phytosanitary standards under consid-
eration or planned for consideration.”77  Other agencies, including the USTR 
and the Department of Commerce, have from time to time, as a matter of 
agency practice, likewise provided public notice of international regulatory 
harmonization activities.78  These opportunities for public input into the U.S. 
position in international regulatory negotiations often include public meetings 
at which participants are informed of the U.S. negotiating position and provide 
comments to agency officials.79  Thus, before entering into active negotiations 
on the Montreal Protocol, the Department of State and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) published a detailed program in the Federal Register 
and invited public comments.  They also issued an environmental impact state-
ment.80  The executive branch also provided Federal Register notice of its intent 
to negotiate NAFTA and held public hearings.81  It did not, however, issue a 
environmental impact statement.    
In the aftermath of unsuccessful efforts by NGOs to judicially challenge the 
failure of the federal government to prepare environmental impact statements 
on the negotiation of  the NAFTA and Uruguay Round agreements,82 President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 13,141 which directs the USTR to prepare an 
environmental review for the negotiation of comprehensive multilateral trade 
rounds, bilateral or plurilateral free trade agreements, and trade agreements in 
natural resource sectors.  The scope of such reviews was expanded in the Bipar-
                                                          
 77. 19 U.S.C. § 2578(c)(1) (2004). 
 78. See Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, supra note 21, at 443-44. 
 79. See Livshiz, supra note 50, at 15. 
 80. Wirth, supra note 14, at 25. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (1992), discussed supra text 
accompanying note 56. 
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tisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, which requires similar reviews of 
the impact of trade agreements on U.S. employment and labor markets.83 
2. Participation of NGO and Business Representatives in International 
Negotiations 
Non-governmental representatives, including representatives of business 
and NGOs, are often included as members of the U.S. delegation to interna-
tional regulatory regime negotiations, including those at the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission.84  They might also participate by virtue of membership on 
USTR advisory committees.85  Additionally, the Transatlantic Business and 
Consumer dialogues, established as part of the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, 
have provided businesses and NGOs with opportunities to consult with gov-
ernment negotiators on issues of transatlantic policymaking.86 
3. Measures to Provide Negotiation Transparency 
The EPA has freely made OECD documentation available to non-
governmental representatives participating in U.S. delegations to the regulatory 
harmonization negotiations held by the OECD Chemicals Group, notwith-
standing the “restricted” status of the documents; this practice has, however, 
not been applied to other aspects of OECD’s work in regulatory harmoniza-
tion.87 
The application of these various types of measures is uneven, and there is no 
consistent overall federal government policy or practice.  Moreover, they are 
generally limited to international negotiations in the context of treaty-based 
regimes and have little or no application to more informal regulatory networks 
and cooperative arrangements regarding mutual recognition and equivalency.  
Non-governmental actors, and especially NGOs, often find that the opportuni-
ties for participation have limited value.  Often the issues presented are highly 
technical.  As a result, many NGOs lack the capacity to participate effectively, 
which helps to explain the low levels of NGO attendance at meetings and of 
                                                          
 83. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c) (2004). Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear what impact such new 
measures will have, particularly since neither the congressional legislation nor the executive order pro-
vides for judicial review and since the executive order explicitly disallows it.  Exec. Order No. 13141, 64 
Fed. Reg. 63169, 63170 (Nov. 16, 1999).  The American Bar Association has recognized the need for 
additional steps to provide greater transparency in connection with international negotiations on regu-
latory harmonization and has recommended that the President encourage federal agencies to provide 
notice and opportunity for comment with respect to negotiation activities, to establish advisory commit-
tees in connection with such negotiations, and to make documents available under FOIA with respect 
to each significant international regulatory harmonization activity in which it is engaged. 
 84. See, e.g., International Standard-Setting Activities, Codex Alimentarius Commission; Duties of 
United States Delegates and Delegation Members Including Non-Government Members, 63 Fed. Reg. 
7118 (Feb. 12, 1998). 
 85. See Wirth, supra note 14, at 25. 
 86. See TRAN. ATL. BUS. DIALOGUE, ABOUT THE TABD, available at http://www.tabd.com/about; 
TRAN. ATL. CONSUMER DIALOGUE, ABOUT TACD (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.tacd.org/about/about.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).   
 87. See Wirth, supra note 14, at 25. 
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submitted comments on U.S. negotiating positions.88  NGOs also tend to view 
the meetings and other procedural opportunities such as notice and opportunity 
for comment as cosmetic in character.  This view might be changed if agency 
officials were required to respond to the comments submitted andpublicly jus-
tify the negotiating positions that they ultimately take. However, the statutory 
and executive iniatitives described above do not impose such requirements. 
Also, business and union groups enjoy preferential or disproportionate ac-
cess to some international negotiations by virtue of their membership on agency 
advisory committees.89  Often there might be one representative for each indus-
try while consumer groups are left with a single representative.  The costs of 
traveling to and participating in distant fora is also a barrier for many NGOs.  
Even when nongovernmental actors are members of delegations or have other 
participation opportunities, they could be effectively shut out of high level ne-
gotiations between principals or otherwise marginalized.90 
Notwithstanding their limitations, wide adoption of such measures could 
have a significant effect in promoting transparency with respect to U.S. federal 
agencies’ participation in global regulatory decisionmaking.  They could also be 
expected to have an influence on subsequent judicial review of domestic im-
plementing measures by providing potential litigants with additional informa-
tion and insight regarding the global regulatory background and facilitating ex-
pansion of the administrative record and the range of factors considered by re-
viewing courts.  It is, of course, quite possible that non-state actors based in 
other countries could seek to take advantage of these measures, including op-
portunity for comment and subsequent judicial review.91  That could be an im-
portant first step in the development of a genuinely cosmopolitan administra-
tive law. 
The limitations of such efforts in dealing with the more informal modes of 
global regulatory decisionmaking must, however, be emphasized.  Extension of 
U.S. administrative law to U.S. officials’ participation in global regulatory deci-
sionmaking might be strongly resisted by other nations.  They might fear that 
such initiatives would undermine the informality, confidentiality, and efficiency 
of international negotiations, and enhance U.S. leverage in international nego-
tiations.  Developing countries might fear that such measures would provide 
additional and unwelcome influence for northern NGOs. 
                                                          
 88. See Livshiz, supra note 50, at 20. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Press Release, Trans Atl. Consumer Dialogue, U.S.—EU Summit Puts Business 
CEOs Ahead of Consumer Groups (June 23, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.tacd.org/press/?id=39 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) (announcing a boycott of a summit of the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership by TACD when business groups were offered a meeting with 
Presidents of the United States and the European Council, but consumer groups were denied a similar 
meeting).   
 91. Cf. Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir 1999) (entertaining but rejecting 
on the merits a claim by foreign telecommunications carrier that FCC regulations implementing as 
WTO agreement had legally impermissible extraterritorial effects on foreign carriers). 
112905 03_STEWART.DOC 1/10/2006  10:23 AM 
88 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:63 
On the other hand, such initiatives, especially if matched by similar initia-
tives from the E.U. and other major jurisdictions, could prod the adoption by 
global regulatory regimes of administrative law mechanisms in order to pre-
empt, fend off, or manage the impact of different, uncoordinated domestic ad-
ministrative law requirements, as suggested by the experience with interna-
tional sports federations discussed previously. 
IV 
“TOP DOWN” APPROACHES TO  
DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
An alternative to “bottom up” is to construct new administrative law 
mechanisms directly at the level of global regulatory regimes.  Fully implement-
ing a U.S.-style system of administrative law through such a “top down” ap-
proach would require global institutional structures with distinct legislative, 
administrative, and independent reviewing bodies.  Such a structure involves a 
considerably higher degree of institutional differentiation and legalization than 
currently exists.  It might also require substantial precision in legal norms that 
are binding within the regime.92  A few treaty-based regimes exhibit these char-
acteristics, but most do not.  Regulatory networks are typically not character-
ized by significant institutional differentiation, although some network regimes 
have developed committee structures and may evolve further.93  Arrangements 
among national regulators for mutual recognition and other forms of equiva-
lency cooperation among national regulators generally do not involve any dis-
tinct transnational institutional structures.  Accordingly, the development of a 
global administrative law resembling the U.S. model will ultimately depend on 
whether there is considerable further development of institutional differentia-
tion and legalization in global regulatory regimes.  If informal regulatory net-
works or horizontal methods of regulatory cooperation have advantages that 
enable them to acquire a greater role in global regulation than more legalized 
treaty-based or network regimes,94 the development of global administrative law 
might be correspondingly hindered. 
A. Types of Global Regulatory Regime Structures 
A number of treaty-based regulatory regimes are institutionally differenti-
ated and relatively highly legalized. 95  The administrative and reviewing compo-
                                                          
 92. For discussion of delegation, precision, and binding quality as the defining characteristics of 
legalization of international regimes, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 
INT’L ORG. 401 (2000). 
 93. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 U. 
CHI. INT’L L.J. 17-19 (2005).  For example, the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“ISOCO”) has a fairly well-developed committee structure. See http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
about.cfm?whereami=page2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
 94. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 171-94 (discussing the advantages of-
fered by informal networks of regulators). 
 95. I am grateful to Ernestine Meijer for identifying and summarizing many of the regimes dis-
cussed in this subsection. 
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nents and functions in such regimes can be conceptualized in more than one 
way, with varying implications for the current states and for future development 
of administrative law at the global regime level.   
1. International Treaty-Based Regimes that Directly Regulate Non-State 
Actors 
Only a few international regimes currently exercise direct regulatory author-
ity over non-state actors through the decisions of administrative bodies exercis-
ing regulatory authority.  One example is the CDM Executive Board, which 
determines the eligibility of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction credits to which 
they are entitled.  Another is the Security Council’s 1267 Committee listing de-
cisions.96  A third is the determination by UNCHR of individuals’ refugee status.  
At present, none of these regimes provides affected persons with procedural 
rights similar to those afforded under domestic administrative law in the U.S. or 
many other nations, and none provides for review by an independent tribunal 
of the administrative decisions in question.  The intensification of international 
regulation is likely to result in more regimes exercising direct administrative 
regulatory authority over non-state actors, which will increase pressures for the 
development of procedural and reviewing mechanisms to protect the rights and 
interests of those regulated. 
2. International Treaty-Based Regimes that Regulate through Member 
State Compliance or Implementation 
In most cases, the regulatory norms adopted by international regimes are 
implemented through member state laws and administrative decisions that are 
in turn applied to domestic non-state actors.  There are several different ways of 
conceptualizing the applicability of administrative law disciplines to such an ar-
rangement.  In one conceptualization, the individual member states are the 
regulated entities.  In another, the regulated entities are the domestic non-state 
actors, and the individual member states are the administrative bodies respon-
sible for implementing the global regulatory program through controls on the 
non-state actors.  Some international regulatory regimes, including a number of 
international human rights regimes and the IMF and World Bank, are aimed 
exclusively or primarily at the conduct of states.  But many other international 
regulatory regimes are aimed at both the conduct of states and the conduct of 
non-state actors.  They can be analyzed under either conception.  The discus-
sion that follows provides examples of the application of each conception, in-
cluding a number of regimes discussed under both. 
a. States as the regulated entities.  Under this conception, the legislative 
body is the group of states that ratify the regime treaty, which is the legislation 
for the regime and binds states that are parties.  The regulated entities are the 
                                                          
 96. Although member states must implement freezes of listed persons’ assets, implementation in 
many states is automatic, making the effective impact of committee listing decisions direct. 
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individual state parties responsible for implementing the norms thus adopted.  
In order to develop a U.S.-style administrative law under this conceptualization, 
the regime would have to include not only the legislative body, but a distinct 
administrative body with the power to adopt or apply regime norms that are 
binding on member states.  In addition, it would have to have a distinct inde-
pendent reviewing body that determines the conformance of the decisions of 
the administrative body with the regime’s legislative norms, including both sub-
stantive and procedural requirements.97  A substantial number of regimes have 
two out of these three bodies, but only a few have all three.   
 (1) Regimes with independent, norm-generating administrative bodies 
  (a) Adoption of subsidiary regulatory norms by a majority of 
regime state parties.  Muddying the distinction between legislative and adminis-
trative is the circumstance that in many regimes the COP, besides being the of-
ficial legislative body responsible for the treaty and amendments to it, fulfills 
functions that can, in the context of international law, be regarded as adminis-
trative in character because it involves the creation of subsidiary norms without 
following the procedures, such as ratification, required for treaty law.  In some 
cases, states that are members of treaty-based international organizations fulfill 
this role as well.  For example, under the London Convention,98 the Bonn Con-
vention,99 the Basel Convention,100 and CITES,101 the COP has the power to 
amend, by majority decision, annexes to the treaties that specify in greater de-
tail the regulatory obligations of parties.  Unlike amendment to the treaties, 
these annex amendments do not need ratification of the parties in order to en-
ter into force.102 
Under the Montreal Protocol, the Meeting of the Parties (MOP), operating 
by two-thirds majority vote, has the authority to modify the Protocol’s regula-
tory requirements, which are binding on Parties.103  For example, “adjust-
                                                          
 97. These administrative bodies act on the basis of powers conferred to them and on the basis of 
procedural rules adopted by legislative bodies authorizing them to create, extinguish, modify and apply 
primary rules that establish the substantive norms of conduct required of the regulated entities.  The 
distinction between primary and secondary rules is developed in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
(1994); see also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 92. 
 98. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
Dec. 29, 1972, art. 15, para. 2, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.  For reasons noted above, some of the 
regimes discussed in this subsection can also be fruitfully analyzed under the alternative conception, 
which regards states as administrative agencies and non-state actors as the regulated entities; this con-
ception is discussed infra, Section IV.2. 
 99. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, art. 11, 
1990 U.K.T.S. No. 87. 
 100. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657. 
 101. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 
1973, art. 15, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 102. State Parties having objections to the amendments can generally make reservations to them. 
Not making objections is considered as consent. 
 103. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 19, 1987, art. 2, paras. 
9(c), 10(b), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 293. 
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ments”104 made to the Protocol by the MOP in 1990 and 1992 determined that 
production and consumption of CFCs should be phased out completely by 1996.  
Similar far-reaching changes have subsequently been adopted for regulation of 
other ozone-depleting substances listed in the various annexes to the Protocol.105  
Similarly, a majority of the states that are members of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) can modify regulatory requirements that are 
binding on all members under the Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation.106  Amendment procedures like those found in the Montreal Protocol 
and ICAO generally deal with subjects considered technical in nature or that 
require frequent adjustment of regulatory norms due to changes in information 
and circumstance (or both).  Such measures, however, often have major practi-
cal consequences. 
In the Bretton Woods organizations, the member states or their representa-
tives can act by other than unanimous vote to modify otherwise applicable 
treaty norms or adopt binding subsidiary norms.  Thus, three-quarters of the 
WTO member states can grant, for a limited term, exemptions from the disci-
plines of WTO Agreements.107  The World Bank and the IMF generate subsidi-
ary regulatory norms through decisions by representatives of member nations—
the Bank’s Board of Directors and the IMF’s Managing Directors—who decide 
through a system of weighted voting based on the member states’ financial con-
tributions.  Another example is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which 
consists of representatives of Member Nations and Associate Members of FAO 
or WHO.108  Acting by majority vote, the Commission issues food standards to 
protect consumer health and to ensure fair business practices.  The procedure 
for adopting standards includes an extensive role for expert committees. 
  (b)  Adoption of binding subsidiary norms by purely adminis-
trative bodies.  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board 
Protocol is an example of a treaty regime authority that more closely approxi-
mates the domestic law conception of an administrative body.109  The Board en-
gages in subsidiary lawmaking through both rulemaking and adjudication.  It 
                                                          
 104. Id., art. 2, para. 9. 
 105. Unlike the London, Bonn, Basel and CITES Conventions, these “adjustments” are binding to 
the State parties to the Protocol, without a possibility to object to them.  See Robin R. Churchill & Geir 
Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little 
Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623 (2000). 
 106. Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, art. 90 juncto art. 54(l), 61 Stat. 
1180; T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
 107. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), Art. IX (3). 
 108. Established by a resolution of the Food and Agriculture Organization (Eleventh Session of the 
Conference of FAO in 1961) and a resolution of the World Health Organization (Sixteenth World 
Health Assembly in 1963).  See “The Codex system: FAO, WHO and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission” (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs., available at http://www.fao.org/documents/ 
show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
 109. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add. 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Febru-
ary 16, 2005), art. 12. 
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approves the methodologies used in specific CDM projects, takes decisions on 
accreditation of CDM operational entities, decides on the registration of a pro-
ject under CDM and on the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
for projects.110 These decisions not only have binding consequences for partici-
pating states but also for private parties, as discussed above. 
Another example of a purely administrative body exercising legally binding 
authority is provided by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), an in-
ternational regulatory organization concerned with animal diseases and their 
spread and responsible for issuing and administering the Animal Health Code. 
The OIE is governed by an International Committee, composed of technical 
representatives appointed by each of the participating States.111  The OIE has 
specialist Commissions on a number of animal diseases, among which is the 
OIE Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics Commission, composed of 
six experts.112  This Commission makes the initial decision to grant a country a 
“foot and mouth disease (FMD) free” status,113 although its decision has to be 
ratified by the International Committee.  Such decisions have enormous conse-
quences for a country’s trade in animals and animal products. 
The administrative managements of the World Bank and the IMF adopt, 
impose, and police conditions on loans and other forms of financial assistance 
to member states that have important regulatory impacts on those states.  These 
country-specific conditions are in principle legally enforceable by the Bank and 
Fund.  The Bank has also adopted guidelines relating to environmental and so-
cial issues that apply to all grants; compliance with these conditions is subject to 
review by the Bank’s Inspection Panel. 
Similarly, the listing of persons determined to be financing international ter-
rorism by the U.N. Security Council 1267 Committee is another example of an 
administrative body whose decisions have binding authority.  U.N. member 
states are obligated to freeze the assets of persons listed and take other speci-
fied steps to assist the work of the committee. In this case, the administrative 
decisions effectively bind listed individuals as well as member states.   Similarly, 
the UNHCR’s adjudication of individuals’ refugee status has legally binding 
implications for U.N. member states’ treatment of such individuals as well as 
the individuals. 
  (c) Other administrative bodies.  In addition, a number of 
treaty-based regimes have subsidiary bodies that develop detailed procedures 
                                                          
 110. Articles 5, 36, and 65 of the CDM Modalities and Procedures.  See Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Addendum, 
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 
2002) [hereinafter Conference Report]. 
 111. Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties (“OIE”), art. 6 (appendix to the 
International Agreement establishing the OIE, January 25, 1924). 
 112. Established on the basis of the General Rules of the OIE, May 24, 1973, art. 18. 
 113. The different categories of “disease free” are laid down in the Animal Health Code, ch. 2.1.1 
(on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/ 
en_chapitre_2.1.1.htm  (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
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and protocols for implementing international regulatory treaties, which are not 
legally binding as such, but are either subsequently adopted as binding by the 
COP or function as non-binding but highly influential guidance for implementa-
tion by member states.  These institutions represent an intermediate stage of 
institutional differentiation that might eventually ripen into authority to adopt 
binding norms.114  Examples of such institutions are the Methodology Panel and 
the Accreditation Panel established by the CDM Executive Board,115 the Sub-
sidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,116 and the Scientific Council of the Bonn Convention on migratory spe-
cies.117 
 (2) Regimes with reviewing bodies but no administrative bodies.  Al-
though in form a system of tribunals for resolving controversies between states, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and especially its Appellate Body, increas-
ingly function as a regulatory administrative body with the aim of constructing a 
fully articulated trade regulatory system and supervising its implementation by 
member states.118  The Appellate Body’s hesitant provision for amicus briefs 
submitted by non-state actors in order to obtain information and views of non-
state actors within the trade regulatory regime,119 and its development of admin-
istrative law requirements for member state implementation of WTO agree-
ments,120 reflect this function. 
Other prominent examples of regimes with strong reviewing tribunals in this 
category can be found in human rights treaties with an individual complaints 
clause. Under these treaties, individuals subject to actions of member state can 
obtain review of those actions by international tribunals with the power to de-
termine whether they comply with regime norms.  The European Convention 
on Human Rights, for example, authorizes the European Court on Human 
Rights to make decisions, binding on member states, on behalf of any person, 
non-governmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the vic-
                                                          
 114. In respect of the role of science, see also Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses 
and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decision Making, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (2001). 
 115. Pursuant to Article 18 of the CDM Modalities and Procedures.  See Conference Report, supra  
note 110. 
 116. Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded May 29, 1992, art. 10, U.N. Doc. No. 
A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849.  Both technical bodies play a role in reviewing the reports 
submitted by Annex I Member Parties under Article 12 of the Convention.  Id. 
 117. Article VIII of the Bonn Convention, supra note 99. 
 118. See John T. Soma & Eric K. Wiengarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects and the 
Need for an International Antitrust Response from the World Trade Organization: A Case Study in 
Broadcast-Media and News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 127 (2000) (referring to the 
WTO as an “international trade regulatory body” that is embodied in the authority given to the dispute 
resolution mechanism). 
 119. WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (98-000), para. 9 (Oct. 12, 1998). 
 120. See Sabino Cassese, Global Standards For National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005);  Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: the Euro-
peanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 563 
(2003). 
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tim of a violation of one of the human rights in the Convention or the protocols 
thereto.121  The court’s decisions have profoundly important regulatory impacts 
on the practices of member states and, in many cases, of business firms and 
other private actors regulated by those states. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has an optional 
protocol122 under which a State allows the Human Rights Committee to consider 
complaints of individuals under its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a vio-
lation by that State of one or more of the rights set forth in the Covenant.  A 
total of 104 States have ratified this optional protocol.123  The recommendations 
of the Committee are not binding on the State Party but may have normative 
force.  Similar provisions on individual complaints exist under the Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination124 and the Convention against Tor-
ture.125  A somewhat different approach to reviewing member state compliance 
with an international human rights regime is found in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights.  Aggrieved individuals or groups must first apply to an ad-
ministrative body, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which is 
the sole body that can bring claims before the Court.  The Commission investi-
gates applications and has discretion to decide which claims to prosecute before 
the Court.  Decisions are binding on states that have ratified the convention. 
Another important example of independent review of non-compliance by 
State Parties is the investor protection provisions of NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 
which authorize investors of a NAFTA Party to bring claims before arbitral tri-
bunals against another NAFTA Party asserting violations of  NAFTA’s Chap-
ter 11, Part A (including provisions on national treatment of investors).126  Tri-
bunal decisions are binding on the parties and enforceable within the domestic 
legal context of the State Party against whom the claim was brought.127  Similar 
arrangements are provided in many bilateral treaties.  These decisions will have 
increasingly important impacts on domestic regulation and administrative law. 
 (3) Regimes with both administrative and reviewing bodies.  Separate 
independent regime bodies with authority to review the decisions of subsidiary 
norm-generating administrative bodies within the same regime have emerged 
                                                          
 121. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, arts. 34, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. 5, amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 
45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118. 
 122. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966. 
 123. See United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights report “Status of ratifications of the 
principal international human rights treaties” (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
 124. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 
2106 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966). 
 125. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 22, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. 
 126. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, arts. 1102-1106, 1110, 32 I.L.M.642 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. See generally GREENING NAFTA, THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David L. Markell & John Knox eds., 2003). 
 127. Id., art. 1135, para 1. 
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only recently.  There are only a few examples of such arrangements, but their 
number might grow with the intensification of global regulation and demands 
by affected non-state actors for administrative law protections and methods for 
securing greater accountability for the decision of global regulatory administra-
tive bodies. 
The most notable example is the World Bank Inspection Panel, which re-
views whether Bank-funded projects conform to the Bank’s environmental and 
social guidelines.128  Originally adopted as a technique of control by the Board of 
Executive Directors of the Bank’s management and as a tool of internal ad-
ministration, the Panel mechanism has developed into a more or less independ-
ent reviewing forum that can be invoked by NGOs and other non-governmental 
actors.  In a formal sense, the Panel’s powers are limited.  It needs Bank au-
thorization to investigate a case, and its findings and recommendations are not 
binding.  However, the Panel report, the management’s recommendations, and 
the Board’s decision must be made publicly known.  These circumstances can 
generate strong pressures for the Bank’s management and Board to follow the 
Panel’s recommendations.129  The International Finance Corporation has con-
sidered the adoption of a similar system.130 
A second example of an independent body reviewing decisions of subsidiary 
administrative decisionmaking entities is the Seabed Disputes Chamber (SDC) 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).131 The SDC has 
jurisdiction with respect to different types of seabed-related disputes involving 
various parties, including states, state enterprises, and private firms and indi-
viduals.  In these disputes, the SDC applies the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); other international law compatible with 
UNCLOS; rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority adopted in ac-
cordance with UNCLOS; and the terms of contracts concerning activities in the 
area in matters relating to those contracts.  Its decisions are binding and domes-
tically enforceable.132 
b. Individual member states as implementing administrative agencies; 
non-state actors as regulated entities.  An alternative conceptualization of global 
regulatory regimes with a relatively high degree of institutional differentiation 
                                                          
 128. See generally DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD 
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY]; David Hunter, Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the 
Interests of Project-affected People, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 201 (2003); Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection 
Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y 
SYMPOSIUM 61 (1997). 
 129. DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 128, at 178-82. 
 130. INT’L FIN. CORP., COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, 2004 (on file with Law & Contemp. 
Probs.), available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).   
 131. Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 277, 287-88 (2001).  See generally on UNCLOS, ITLOS and jurisdiction, John E. Noyes, The Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109 (1998). 
 132. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 293, 33, 39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 387, reprinted 
in 21 I.L.M. 1261. 
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and legalization is that the regime member states collectively compromise the 
legislative body, the members states individually are the administrative bodies 
responsible for implementing regime norms, the firms and other non-
governmental entities subject to regulation by member states are the regulated 
entities, and the regime dispute settlement tribunal is the reviewing body that 
determines compliance with regime norms by the implementing member states, 
regarded as administrative bodies. 
This model can be applied to regimes, like the WTO, that lack a regime-
level administrative body but have strong regime-level tribunals and that aim to 
establish a sound regulatory system for private market actors.  But it can also be 
applied to regimes, like the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, that also have regime-level 
administrative bodies.  Such regimes accordingly have a two-level administra-
tive structure, including both a regime-level body like the Executive Board, and 
the implementing member-states, who are bound by the norms adopted by the 
regime-level administrative body.  This arrangement is analogous to that of the 
E.U., in which member states implement E.U. regulations subject to the super-
vision of the Commission and the Court of Justice, and to systems of “coopera-
tive federalism” in the United States, under which states implement federal en-
vironmental, social service, and other regulatory programs under the supervi-
sion of federal administrative authorities and courts. 
The conception that non-state actors are the regulated entities presents an 
evolution of international regulation away from a state-centric mode and to-
wards a conception of global regulation of market actors, with states serving an 
intermediate position.  Examples of such regimes include the WTO, the Mont-
real Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)—and especially the Appellate 
Body—has increasingly defined its role as promoting the sound and consistent 
regulation of the international trade regime.  The DSB understands that the 
ultimate subjects of trade regulation are market economic actors, and that its 
role is to promote open and even-handed competition and predictability in the 
collective regulatory trade fabric (woven out of individual member state deci-
sionmaking procedures and measures and out of WTO law), consistent with  
appropriate regard for member state latitude in domestic policies.  DSB pro-
ceedings initiated by member states are formally the adjudication of disputes 
between states; but functionally, in many instances, they are the occasion for 
the DSB to exercise this supervisory and reviewing role over the implementa-
tion of the WTO trade regulatory regime.  Further, there are emerging signs 
that the DSB regards member states as administrative agencies within this sys-
tem.  In order to promote an even-handed and predictable system of interna-
tional trade regulation, the DSB has required member states that adopt trade-
restrictive regulatory measures to adopt administrative law disciplines, includ-
ing providing decisional transparency, opportunity for affected private parties 
to be heard, and reasoned justifications for decisions made.133  These rulings 
                                                          
 133. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 120; Giacinto della Cananea, supra note 120. 
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very much resemble those of U.S. courts reviewing administrative agency deci-
sions.  The reformation of regulatory decisionmaking by domestic administra-
tive agencies through global administrative law disciplines will be further inten-
sified with implementation of the TRIPS and GATS agreements. 
The Kyoto Protocol is another example of a regime that is substantially ori-
ented towards regulation of market actors, who play an explicit, implementing 
role in the CDM and who will play an important role in the other flexibility 
mechanisms, especially emissions allowance trading.  In order to secure effec-
tive regulatory implementation by Annex I Parties, the COP/MOP has estab-
lished a compliance mechanism by creating a regime-level administrative body, 
the Compliance Committee, consisting of a facilitative branch and an enforce-
ment branch.134  The enforcement branch can review member state compliance 
and thereby secure the environmental and economic integrity of global emis-
sions trading systems in which private actors will play an important role. 
The Montreal Protocol similarly aims at effective regulation of private mar-
ket actors; among other matters, it addresses issues of industrial rationalization 
in ozone-depleting substances (ODS) production and ODS trade-related is-
sues.135  The Protocol was one of the first environmental regimes that included 
an institutionalized compliance mechanism involving a regime-level body of an 
administrative nature, the Implementation Committee, which has the authority 
to decide on compliance measures and potential sanctions, although in practice 
it has tended to follow a cooperative, facilitative approach to dealing with coun-
tries’ compliance difficulties. 
Under the three above regimes, non-compliance proceedings are initiated 
by State Parties, although under the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols, regime-
level administrative authorities can also initiate compliance proceedings.  En-
forcement by States is not inconsistent with a conception of the regimes in 
which private market actors are the subjects of regulation; compliant Member 
States and their firms have a strong economic interest in correcting non-
compliance by other member states in order to protect their own firms against 
unfair competition from firms in non-compliant states. 
The International Labor Organization provides for initiation of non-
compliance proceedings by private market actors against member States that 
fail to implement ILO norms.  An industrial association of employers or work-
ers can file a complaint with the International Labor Office that a Member 
State has failed to secure the effective observance within its jurisdiction of an 
ILO Convention to which it is a party.  The ILO Governing Body in its turn 
may communicate this representation to the government against which the 
complaint is made and invite that government to make a statement on the sub-
                                                          
 134. Conference of the Parties Decision 24/CP.7 “Procedures and mechanisms relating to compli-
ance under the Kyoto Protocol,” in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, 
Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, Vol. 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002). 
 135. On the Montreal Protocol and non-compliance, see Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compli-
ance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377 (2002). 
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ject.  If the government does not produce a statement within a reasonable time 
or if the statement is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing Body, this 
Body has the right to publish the representation and the statement, if any, made 
in reply to it.136 
3. Complex Regimes 
A number of the regimes discussed above have such a high degree of institu-
tional differentiation and legalization that they can be classified as complex re-
gimes; such regimes are most likely to exhibit the characteristics of delegation 
and norm specificity and authority that are favorable to the development of 
U.S.-style administrative law at the regime level. 
One form of complexity is found in regimes whose regulatory norms (1) in-
clude subsidiary norms adopted by the member states (often by majority vote) 
or by regime-level administrative bodies, and (2) govern the conduct of individ-
ual member states but are also implemented by member states with the objec-
tive of regulating private sector actors.137  This arrangement combines the two 
conceptions of international regulatory regimes set forth above: those that di-
rectly regulate non-state actors and those that regulate member state conduct.138  
Examples of such arrangements include the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, the OIE, the World Bank, the LOS seabed regime, and possibly the ILO.  
When the WTO DSB is regarded as an administrative authority, the WTO can 
also be included. 
In addition, some of these regimes provide for a further degree of institu-
tional differentiation and legalization by establishing a regime-level reviewing 
body that can review either the adoption of subsidiary norms by regime admin-
istrative bodies or compliance by individual member states with regime norms 
(both primary and subsidiary), or both.  Examples of such tribunals include the 
World Bank Inspection Panel and the compliance institutions established under 
the Montreal Protocol and Kyoto Protocol.  This is also the legal institutional 
model generally followed for E.C. regulation.  A still greater degree of com-
plexity is provided by global regimes with the power to directly regulate private 
market actors as well as the conduct of member states and to use them as ad-
ministrative bodies to implement regulation of private market actors.  Combin-
ing these arrangements with a regime-level reviewing tribunal results in the 
greatest degree of institutional differentiation and legalization. 
This is the model followed in the United States under “cooperative federal-
ism” programs in which, for example, states exercise delegated authority to im-
plement federal environmental statutes by regulating private actors; in doing so, 
                                                          
 136. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, arts. 24, 25, 49, Stat. 2712, 
15 U.N.T.S. 35. 
 137. Still another potential conception is to view regime tribunals as the administrative bodies gen-
erating subsidiary norms that bind member states or regulated firms.  It is possible to view powerful 
regime tribunals such as the DSB in this fashion.  But this conception leaves no conceptual or institu-
tional space for a separate reviewing tribunal, unless a general international court with jurisdiction to 
review the decisions of the various tribunals of individual regimes were to emerge. 
    138.   See supra Part IV.A.1-2.  
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they must follow requirements adopted by the federal EPA and thus be subject 
to review by federal courts.  Regulated actors are also subject to direct en-
forcement actions by EPA.  The international regulatory regime that most 
closely approximates this model is the Kyoto Protocol.  The CDM Executive 
Board is already exercising the power to develop and apply subsidiary norms 
that bind member states and private actors, and the Subsidiary Bodies for Im-
plementation and Technical Assistance are approaching this function.  The de-
velopment of Kyoto Protocol regime compliance mechanisms are likely to in-
clude a tribunal that will review not only compliance by member states but also 
by private market actors, as well as the generation of subsidiary norms by re-
gime administrative bodies.  Because the success of global emissions trading 
markets is essential to the success of the regulatory scheme, the regime and 
states participating in it will have strong incentives to develop the necessary in-
stitutional means of meeting the need of market actors for legal predictability 
and swift resolution of disputes. 
Another element of complexity is the extent to which global regulatory re-
gimes have sought to transform domestic administrative law in order to ensure 
more effective implementation by domestic administrative agencies of the 
global regulatory system.  Professors Cassese and della Cananea have shown 
how the WTO DSB is developing a body of requirements for Member State 
decisionmaking in domestic trade-related regulatory administration that 
amounts to a globalized system of administrative law at the domestic level.139  
These developments will intensify as TRIPS and GATS are fully implemented.  
These systems of administrative law are designed and required to ensure effec-
tive implementation of global regulatory regime norms in member states with 
the objective of effective and consistent regulation of public and private market 
actors.  Similar systems of  administrative law to assure proper implementation 
are found in the development of an E.U. administrative law applicable to mem-
ber states and in “cooperative federalism” arrangements in the United States.  
Such systems are likely to emerge under other intentional regulatory regimes, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol or its equivalent, that rely on statutory-adjudicatory 
strategies to achieve effective and uniform regulation of global market actors. 
A final element of complexity is created when several international regula-
tory regimes deal in a linked way with the same area.  Examples include the 
WTO, Codex, and IOE in the context of food and plant safety regulation.  An-
other is the interaction of the WTO and TRIPS, the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research in dealing with plant genetic re-
sources.140  Such complex regimes exhibit arrangements of functions and au-
thorities that are partially shared and partially independent, creating a global 
                                                          
 139. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 120; Giacinto della Cananea, supra note 120. 
 140. Kal Raustiala & David Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L 
ORG. 277 (2004). 
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version of separation of powers; the implications for the development of admin-
istrative law have yet to be addressed. 
These various elements of complexity make out a large and important field 
for further research.  A systematic comparative analysis of the most important 
international regulatory regimes, using typologies like those advanced in this 
article, would be of great value in considering the potential for a global adminis-
trative law as well as for the study of global regulatory institutions more gener-
ally. 
B. Implications of Regime Structure for Development of Administrative Law 
at the Global Regulatory Regime Level 
1. Administrative Law Elements in Different Global Regulatory Regimes: 
Emerging Patterns 
The basic elements of administrative law include transparency and access to 
information; participation in administrative decisionmaking through the sub-
mission of information, analysis, and views; a requirement of a reasoned deci-
sion by the administrative decisionmaker; review of the decision for legality by 
an independent tribunal; and the application of the reviewing body of certain 
substantive principles such as means-ends rationality and proportionality.  U.S. 
administrative law presents these elements in an especially strong form.141     
As might be expected, the adoption of administrative law elements tends to 
be significantly greater in complex treaty-based regulatory regimes that are 
relatively highly institutionally differentiated and legalized, and that have well-
developed administrative bodies.  The extent of the regime’s impact on private 
market actors and the extent of NGO activity also appear to be important fac-
tors.  There has been a considerable development of international NGOs in the 
past fifteen years as they have lobbied for greater transparency and participa-
tion in global regulatory regimes.  Also, domestic NGOs in the U.S. and else-
where, frustrated by the limited availability and efficacy of opportunities to in-
fluence global regulation through domestic political and administrative law 
mechanisms, have begun to focus on issues of transparency, participation, and 
review at the global regulatory regime level.  NGO attention at the global level 
has, however, been selective.  For example, the World Bank, the WTO, and the 
Codex are among the regimes that have been targeted for reform, whereas rela-
tively little attention has been paid to other perhaps equally important regimes, 
such as the IMF and banking regulation. 
Participation through established procedures in regime administrative deci-
sionmaking is considerably advanced in some relatively complex treaty-based 
international regulatory regimes with strong, norm-generating administrative 
                                                          
     141.  See supra, Part II.  It is far beyond the scope of this article to catalogue or analyze the extent to 
which these various elements of administrative law have been adopted within various global regulatory 
regimes.  These questions are part of the research agenda of the NYU Project on Global Administra-
tive Law (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.).  See http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2005).     
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authorities, such as the Codex, OIE, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.  The decisions of these regimes is of great importance and interest both to 
multinational businesses and to NGOs, who have lobbied strongly for transpar-
ency and participation.  Transparency and participation have been extensively 
developed under CITES, which has been a strong focus of environmental NGO 
energies.  However, none of these regimes has developed a reviewing body 
analogous to courts or administrative tribunals within domestic systems.  Thus, 
the OIE, Codex, and CITES have no reviewing body.  The Montreal Protocol 
non-compliance mechanism assists and prods member states to achieve compli-
ance.  The non-compliance mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol are still being 
constructed and no reviewing function has emerged within the CDM, although 
there will be strong pressures to develop one. 
The Codex provides a good example of experience with the development of 
greater transparency and participation over the past fifteen years.  Founded in 
1962 by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the Codex is responsible for developing and adopting 
food safety standards that relate to human health.  Until the adoption of the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement in 1994, Codex was 
largely hidden from public scrutiny as the standards it adopted were non-
binding.  Because of the non-binding nature of its work, the Codex did not 
arouse much attention from stakeholders or the media,142 and was primarily a 
technocratic forum dominated by government experts.  The Codex’s relative 
anonymity ended with the implementation of the SPS Agreement, which gave 
WTO member states strong incentives to adopt Codex standards as a “safe har-
bor” against WTO challenge.143  This stimulated increased interest by NGOs in 
the work of the Codex.  Several NGOs applied for and received observer status, 
while others were able to place their representatives as parts of national delega-
tions in order to influence regulatory decisions by Codex administrative bod-
ies.144 
In other regimes, including the World Bank, human rights bodies, and the 
ILO, non-state actors have the ability to invoke reviewing body procedures.  In 
the case of the ILO and the human rights regimes, review is directed to compli-
ance by member states.  The human rights regimes lack developed administra-
tive authorities, while the ILO follows a corporatist model, which is probably 
not conducive to the development of administrative law on the U.S. model.  In 
the case of the World Bank, review is directed at compliance by the administra-
tive arm of the bank itself, which is a strong body with the ability to adopt and 
                                                          
 142. However, Codex did provide opportunities for certain stakeholders to participate in its work.  
See Codex Alimentarius Commission, NGO Participation (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
available at http://www.codexaliment arius.net/ngo_participation.stm  (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) 
[hereinafter NGO Participation].  
 143. Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization 
and International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Plant Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & 
COM. 27, 41-43 (1998). 
 144. Livshiz, supra note 50, at 4, 21. 
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implement subsidiary norms.  This creates a situation favorable to the further 
development of administrative law. 
In parallel with the development of the Inspection Panel, the Bank has also 
taken steps to promote transparency and to develop opportunities for participa-
tion through consultation with respect to both general Bank policies and major 
Bank-funded development projects; the interaction between these participation 
opportunities and the availability of review through the Inspection Panel, how-
ever, has yet to be systematically examined.  The Bank thus represents a rela-
tively highly advanced stage of administrative law, although still short of incor-
porating all of the elements of a U.S. model.  It is striking that the state of ad-
ministrative law at the IMF, a sister Bretton Woods institution with a quite 
similar governance structure, should still be so rudimentary.  The extent to 
which this disparity is due to the differences in the subjects regulated by the two 
institutions or other factors is still to be adequately examined.145 
The WTO is an example of a treaty-based regime that lacks an administra-
tive body with authority to generate and implement subsidiary norms; instead, 
this function is carried out exclusively by the DSB.  As discussed above, the 
DSB has, perhaps inevitably, given the absence of a strong WTO administrative 
body, increasingly assumed functions that are regulatory and administrative in 
character.  Thus, the Appellate Body has sought to use the resolution of par-
ticular disputes regarding member state compliance to develop systemic norms 
and procedures to govern the trade regulatory regime, including the develop-
ment of a global administrative law for member state authorities whose deci-
sions are regulated by WTO law.  Inevitably, NGOs (and to a much lesser ex-
tent business interests, who often feel that they are adequately represented 
through their governments) have sought increased transparency and rights of 
participation in order to be able to monitor and influence the discharge by the 
DSB of these administrative functions.  But because the DSB is in form a tribu-
nal, this effort has focused on the submission of amicus briefs, which have been 
strongly resisted by developing countries fearful of disproportionate “northern” 
NGO influence on DSB decisions.146 Dispute settlement tribunals established 
under NAFTA Chapter 11 and bilateral investment treaties addressing regula-
tory expropriation claims by investors have come under similar pressures from 
NGOs, who have sought greater transparency in their decisional processes and 
the right to intervene and submit amicus briefs, as these bodies increasingly as-
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sume functions that are administrative in character, including the development 
of an administrative law for domestic regulators.147 
Other treaty-based global regulatory regimes follow a state-centric model of 
governance with only limited administrative law elements, even in those re-
gimes that have developed administrative bodies with significant functions.  Ex-
amples include the IMF and the Security Council 1267 Committee.  This is also 
true of many global regulatory networks, including those dealing with anti-
trust/competition law, debt relief for developing countries (Paris Club), and 
money laundering (Financial Action Task Force).  But other regulatory net-
works have begun to develop significant elements of transparency and partici-
pation.  For example, the Basel Committee, which deals with bank regulation, 
adopted its original capital adequacy requirements through an entirely closed 
“club” process.  But in developing the second version of these requirements, it 
established a website on which drafts and background materials were posted 
and requested comments.148  ISOCO, the international club of securities regula-
tors, is following a similar path.149  The international system of cooperation in 
chemicals regulation has developed an elaborate governance system involving a 
plethora of expert committees that also provides avenues for participation by 
NGOs, such as those concerned with use of animals for testing.150  These devel-
opments appear to be attributable to a desire on the part of the regime mem-
bers to boost their legitimacy with outside constituencies, obtain information 
and feedback to improve the quality of their regulatory efforts, or a combina-
tion of both.  Thus far, however, similar institutional differentiation or the de-
velopment of administrative law elements has not occurred or has occurred 
only to a quite limited degree in regimes of horizontal cooperation for mutual 
recognition or regulatory equivalency determinations. 
2. Administrative Law Lite? 
The preceding overview confirms that development of a U.S.-style adminis-
trative law at the level of international regulatory regimes requires a relatively 
high degree of  institutional differentiation, legalization, and complexity, which 
is often but not always associated with a statutory–regulatory approach to  regu-
lation.  The most favorable condition for the adoption of most administrative 
law elements appears to be when a global regulatory organization has adminis-
trative bodies with important norm-generating power and an independent re-
viewing body, as is the case with the World Bank, although there has been sig-
nificant development of administrative law elements in bodies, such as the Co-
dex, that lack an independent review function. 
                                                          
 147. See, e.g., Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
213 (2001). 
 148. See Zaring, supra note 93, at 28-32. 
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Another hospitable condition for the development of administrative law is 
provided by domestic administrative authorities that implement regulatory law 
developed or implemented by global administrative bodies or tribunals, espe-
cially when there are domestic systems of independent review.  This provides 
the institutional preconditions for global institution requirements that domestic 
governments adopt global administrative law elements to ensure effective and 
faithful implementation of global regulatory law.  Here the WTO and its DSB 
are taking the lead under agreements such as SPS, TRIPS, and GATS, although 
investor protection treaty tribunals and the World Bank (through “good gov-
ernment” initiatives) are also beginning to have a similar impact. 
Yet even the most fully developed systems of administrative law in global 
regulatory institutions, such as the World Bank or Codex, do not include all of 
the administrative law elements in the state of development found in the U.S or 
other advanced countries.  Significant administrative law developments are 
found in many treaty-based regimes and some regulatory networks, but almost 
always without independent reviewing authority.  The state of administrative 
law in other treaty-based regimes, regulatory networks, and in all or almost all 
regimes of horizontal mutual recognition or equivalency cooperation is gener-
ally rudimentary at best.  The independent reviewing courts that play an essen-
tial role in administrative law in the United States and Europe and other ad-
vanced countries are generally absent. 
Traditionally in international law, states have been most reluctant to estab-
lish strong independent tribunals to review state compliance with treaty regime 
norms; the WTO, UNCLOS and certain human rights tribunals are among the 
conspicuous exceptions.  The reasons for this reluctance apply with less force to 
independent mechanisms of review of the decisions of regime-level administra-
tive authorities, as opposed to member states, yet there is a dearth of such re-
viewing bodies.  Thus, for most global regimes for the foreseeable future, ad-
ministrative law will probably have to be built without the presence of strong 
reviewing courts or similar bodies. 
In these circumstances, can some subset of the elements and functions of 
U.S.-style administrative law that do not require a strong, independent review-
ing authority be successfully applied to less institutionally differentiated global 
regulatory regimes?  These elements include arrangements for public access to 
information and other mechanisms to promote decisional transparency on the 
part of regimes’ decisionmaking institutions, including legislative and adminis-
trative bodies and reviewing bodies; notice and opportunity for public comment 
and input of decisions by such institutions; and other mechanisms for participa-
tion in regime decisionmaking, as through attendance at meetings in which de-
cisions are discussed or taken and through membership on advisory or even de-
cisionmaking bodies.  These mechanisms might provide a substantial degree of 
informal responsiveness to those domestic or global economic and social inter-
ests that are organized and are able to take advantage of the opportunities pro-
vided by these mechanisms to monitor and influence regime-level decisions.  
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But they will not provide strong assurances of legality accountability, and in-
deed might even undermine legality, as the U.S. experience with regulatory ne-
gotiation suggests.151 
From a U.S. perspective, such an approach represents, at best, “administra-
tive law lite.”  By elevating accountability to interests over accountability for 
legality, it inverts the order of development and of priorities in U.S. administra-
tive law, which gives precedence to assuring agency compliance with the Consti-
tution, statutes, and the agency’s own regulations over review of the exercise of 
discretion.152  Indeed, it is questionable whether mechanisms that do not provide 
assurances of legality can properly be regarded as administrative law; arguably 
they can at most be regarded as tools of administrative governance.  Beyond 
relying on courts to ensure the legality of administrative action, the United 
States has in recent decades placed a high value on the authority of judges to 
engage in “hard look” reviews of the exercise of agency discretion and to en-
sure reasoned justification for agency policy choices in relation to affected so-
cial interests and underlying facts and analysis.  Other procedural and institu-
tional mechanisms alone have not been thought sufficient to secure the goal of 
deliberative democracy in the context of administrative regulation.  Yet, as pre-
viously noted, in the international institutional context, states have generally 
been quite unwilling to create and cede to other bodies the power to make au-
thoritative determinations of legality or to review the exercise of discretion by 
regime bodies with subsidiary norm-creating authority. 
Is would be exceedingly parochial to think that there can be no genuine sys-
tem of administrative law without the sort of judicial review that has been the 
centerpiece of U.S. and, increasingly, European models of administrative law.  
Indeed, the growth of relatively informal network-based approaches to regula-
tion at the domestic level in the United States are posing a serious challenge to 
traditional models of administrative law built on command and control strate-
gies of regulation.153  Similar issues are arising in Europe.  Conceptions of ad-
ministrative law built solely on accountability to social interests and values 
through mechanisms of transparency and participation without strong reviewing 
tribunals have, however, yet to be developed.  Nonetheless, as Grant and Keo-
hane remind us, there are many mechanisms of accountability other than law 
that can be applied to global regimes, including hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, 
market, peer and public reputational accountability.154  It is quite possible that a 
combination of elements of transparency and participation, when combined 
with other mechanisms of accountability, can function successfully without in-
dependent legal review. 
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3. Prospects for Further Development of Administrative Law in Global 
Regulatory Regimes 
The experience in industrialized countries indicates that the need for institu-
tional specialization, including the use of both administrative and reviewing 
bodies, generally increases as the intensity of regulation increases.  Growing 
global regulatory density will require the elaboration of more detailed norms 
and implementing arrangements.  It also requires constant information-
gathering, analysis, and evaluation of the performance of existing regulatory 
arrangements and the ability to make necessary changes to improve perform-
ance in a timely manner.  Hence, legislative bodies create and delegate author-
ity to subsidiary administrative bodies to elaborate, update, and implement 
regulatory norms.  Such delegations in turn invite the creation of specialized 
reviewing bodies to police conformance by administrative bodies with the terms 
of the delegation and promote impartial and reasonably predictable administra-
tion. 
Experience in Europe and the United States suggests that the need for insti-
tutional differentiation and legalization of regulatory administration is espe-
cially great in two-level jurisdictional systems when it is thought necessary to 
have a system of regulation at the higher level in order to address problems of 
decentralized regulation by many lower level jurisdictions and to assure a regu-
latory “level playing field” among private firms competing in a common mar-
ket.  There are reasons for thinking that this same functional and institutional 
logic will operate at the global level in addressing problems like climate change, 
food, and chemical safety, and many other areas of regulation.  If so, we might 
expect increasing institutional differentiation and legalization in global regula-
tory regimes, and a concomitant growth in global administrative law at both the 
global and domestic levels. 
The experience in the United States and the European Union, however, 
might not necessarily translate inexorably or uniformly into the global context, 
which has very different political and institutional features.  In this context, 
more informal methods of cooperation in achieving common objectives, includ-
ing through regulatory networks and transnational cooperation between regula-
tors in individual countries on equivalency and other issues, might often  have 
functional superiority or be the best that can achieved within the overall politi-
cal structural context of international relations.  As already noted, these less 
formal regimes are not as favorable to development of administrative law.  
Moreover, private and hybrid public–private regulatory organizations and net-
works are coming to play an important role in setting global technical standards 
for products and services, developing labeling and regulatory programs to en-
sure that forest products, apparel, coffee, and other products meet consumers’ 
environmental and labor concerns, and regulating services in areas such as ac-
counting.  Theses regimes, and their domestic counterparts, also present a deep 
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challenge to domestic systems of administrative law developed in a statutory–
adjudicatory context.155 
The considerations influencing global regulatory institutional arrangements 
and the adoption of administrative law elements are political as well as func-
tional.  One must therefore examine, in the context of different types interna-
tional regulatory regimes, the incentives faced by states in deciding whether to 
delegate authority for and thereby lose a degree of control over the adoption 
and content and application of regime norms.  The role and the incentives of 
non-state actors with respect to such decisions are also critically important in 
many contexts.156  Although these issues have been studied extensively in the 
domestic context in the United States and, to a more limited but growing extent 
in Europe,157 social science research is just beginning to address them at the level 
of international regimes. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the potential applications of administrative law 
disciplines—in particular of U.S.-style administrative law—to global regulatory 
regimes, considering both a “bottom up” and a “top down” approach.  The ex-
tent and intensity of global regulation and the development of global adminis-
trative functions and institutions will continue to grow.  This development will 
inevitably result in greater demands for administrative law mechanisms of ac-
countability for the decisions of global regulatory regimes.  Unless those re-
gimes move more rapidly than they have in the past to adopt such mechanisms 
at the regime level, we are likely to witness the extension, by one means or an-
other, of domestic administrative law disciplines of judicial review, of participa-
tion and transparency, of reasoned decision requirements, and of other adminis-
trative law elements to their decisions.  These developments, or their threat, 
will help stimulate the further development of administrative law within global 
regulatory bodies.  At the same time, some global regulatory regimes will con-
tinue the process of developing administrative law requirements for domestic 
decisionmaking by states that are members of the global regulatory regimes.  
Such steps will likely have a reciprocal influence back on the development of 
administrative law at the international regime level.  It will be increasingly diffi-
cult for global regulatory bodies to resist administrative law disciplines that they 
themselves impose on member states. 
The development of global administrative law, however, is by no means an 
inevitably forward process.  Because administrative law as traditionally under-
stood, especially in the United States and other advanced countries, depends on 
a relatively high degree of institutional differentiation and legalization, a critical 
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question is the extent to which international regulatory institutions will develop 
in the direction of greater complexity and legalization.  Will there be increasing 
use of more ambitious and penetrating statutory–adjudicatory systems of regu-
lation, which are likely to bring in its train a system of administrative law that 
bears some resemblance to those in advanced industrial societies?  Or will we 
see a continuing proliferation of relatively informal regulatory networks and 
horizontal methods of regulatory cooperation and accommodation, as well as 
private and private-public regulatory mechanisms that will be less hospitable to 
administrative law institutions based on traditional domestic models?  And, 
what are the incentives of states and powerful non-state actors regarding the 
development of global administrative law in different areas of regulations? 
A final issue is the potential linkage, if any, between global administrative 
law and democracy.158  A system of electorally based representative democracy 
at the global level is at present far beyond reach.  Nor does a consociational 
conception of democracy at the global level based on civil society entities seem 
viable.  Nonetheless, the development of a global administrative law, including 
through “bottom up” as well as “top down” approaches, could work to 
strengthen representative democracy at the national level by making global 
regulatory decisions and institutions more visible and subject to effective scru-
tiny and review within domestic political systems, and thereby promote the ac-
countability of international regulatory decisionmakers through those sys-
tems.159  Systems of global administrative law might also support the develop-
ment of deliberative democracy at the level of global regulatory regimes, al-
though the elements of such a conception as well as the conditions of its effec-
tive realization have yet to be adequately developed. 
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